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This dissertation examines the relationship between changes in the role of female
household members, measured through policy and technological shocks, and child outcomes.
The first chapter uses a bargaining framework to examine how the introduction of female
inheritance rights implemented in four Indian states between 1986 and 1994 impacts the
educational achievement and labor force participation of children. I investigate time varying
state amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 which provided equal inheritance
rights to both male and female children. Using data from the Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series for India (IPUMS India) I find that the probability of primary school completion
rose by 5.8 percentage points, and the probability of labor force participation decreased by
2.8 percentage points for children living in states that implemented reforms relative to con-
trol states. In a sample with a 51 percent primary school completion rate and an 8.8 percent
employment rate for children ages 10-14, these results indicate an 11.4 percent increase in
primary school completion and child labor force participation decreasing to just over two-
thirds of the mean. Performing a triple difference analysis, I find that these results are
larger for Hindu children, female children, and children living in rural areas. These children
are directly affected by the inheritance laws put into place throughout the observed years
of data.
The second chapter uses a time allocation framework to examine how the presence
of household durable goods impacts child outcomes. I use micro-level data from the China
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to test the hypothesis that the presence of time-saving
household appliances caused a decrease in time allocated to housework, increase in school
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enrollment rates, and decrease in labor force participation rates for children ages 12-18 in
China over the last two decades. To control for endogeneity of household durable goods,
I instrument household ownership of each time-saving appliance by the average ownership
rate of that appliance among households with no children living in the same community. I
estimate that living in a household that owns a washing machine: (1) decreases the average
time dedicated to housework by 78 minutes per week, (2) increases the probability of being
enrolled by 12 percentage points, and (3) decreases the probability of being employed by
48 percentage points.
The final chapter, which is joint work with Jaqueline Oliveira, uses a static model
of health, wages, and fertility to examine how family size, specifically number of children,
impacts income risk. We use micro-level data from the China Health and Retirement Lon-
gitudinal Study (CHARLS) to test the hypothesis that households without access to formal
insurance use their children as a way to smooth consumption through transfers. Households
in developing countries have been found to mitigate income risk through alternative infor-
mal insurance methods. Using the occurrence of multiple births (twins) and variations in
the strictness of the One Child Policy to address the endogenity of family size, we estimate
the effect of children on health and income of senior individuals within the household. Given
the lack of formal insurance in developing countries, understanding the different tactics used
to smooth consumption is important for improving the overall well-being of households in
these areas. If households have a way to insure against income risk, consumption should
not vary when an income shock occurs. We use health shocks among senior individuals in
China to proxy for a shock to income. If health care is a large part of household expenses
for senior individuals, a health shock can be seen as an income shock. We hypothesize that
if transfers received from children respond to these health shocks, there will be less of an ef-
fect on consumption of other goods and services following this shock. We find that children
help mitigate the probability of reporting bad health in the current period and mitigate the
decrease in average labor income and average total income for senior individuals when they
experience a health shock in the previous period.
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Attainment and Child Labor:
Evidence from Indian States
1.1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of an increase in female inheritance rights on pri-
mary school completion and child labor force participation in India. Using nationally repre-
sentative data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), variation in the
timing of state amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (HSA 1956), and multiple
child outcomes, I find support for the hypothesis that an increase in female inheritance
rights increased educational attainment and decreased labor force participation for children
in India.
Agarwal (1994) argues that increased female ownership of land raises female bar-
gaining power. With increased wealth or income, a woman can assist with household ex-
penditures and is regarded more highly within her family and by society. I focus on changes
in bargaining power within the household that occur when both men and women have the
legal right to inherit land, as opposed to only men possessing that right. A woman’s in-
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fluence in household decisions depends on direct rights in property, access to community
support, bargaining strength between households, and within household political dynamics
throughout the village (Agarwal, 1994).
Previous literature presumes that females attach higher values to family needs and
children’s welfare and thus devote a higher share of their resources to children (Mencher,
1988; Thomas, 1990; Behrman, 1992; Agarwal, 1994; Strauss et al., 2000; Duflo, 2012).
The allocation of resources provided to children depends on relative weights mothers and
fathers have in the joint household decision process. The bargaining model predicts that as
an amendment to inheritance statutes passes and daughters become eligible to inherit land,
their parents will reallocate resources within the family in favor of the daughter. Parents
may reallocate by increasing education or increasing home labor. Both responses are a
way of providing her resources to help manage the land in the future. An increase in time
devoted to schooling will necessarily lead to a commensurate decrease in overall (home and
wage) labor for children. With an increase in female inheritance rights, it is not only the
daughter who benefits, but the son as well. Since female adults attach high value to children
of both genders, an increase in their bargaining power will increase resources provided to
female and male children.
My results suggest that educational outcomes and child labor force participation
are largest for individuals who are directly affected by the HSA 1956 state amendments.
Interestingly, children who are not directly affected by the amendments but live in states
where these amendments occur experience smaller, but significant effects.
I first perform a difference-in-difference analysis, estimating the effect of an increase
in female inheritance rights obtained through time varying state amendments to the HSA
1956. States without active reforms act as a control group when analyzing the effects of the
reform on child outcomes. I find that children ages 10-14 living in an active reform state
experience an increase in the probability of primary school completion and a decrease in the
probability of labor force participation. These results are of a greater magnitude for Hindu
children, female children, and children residing in rural areas. These children are directly
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affected by the amendments. Children who are indirectly affected by the amendments (non-
Hindu children, male children, and children living in urban areas) experience significant but
smaller effects.1
The timing of the HSA amendments are believed to be exogenous, but the decision
to pass the amendment is endogenous. The difference-in-difference estimation alone is not
sufficient in identifying the effect of the reforms. A triple difference analysis is performed
to estimate the effect of an increase in female inheritance rights on the outcomes of those
who are directly affected by the law change: Hindu children, female children, and children
living in rural areas. The results suggest that Hindu(female/rural) children experience
an additional increase in the probability of completing primary school and a concomitant
decrease in the probability of participating in the labor force when living in a reform state.
This paper is not the first to estimate the effect of the HSA 1956 state amendments
on individuals in India. Researchers exploit the specific timing of these amendments within
each state to estimate the impact of equal inheritance rights on outcomes for both genders.
Deininger, Goyal, and Nagarajan (2013) and Roy (2013) find that an increase in female
inheritance rights obtained through these amendments increases daughters’ likelihood to
inherit land, women’s age at marriage, and daughters’ educational attainment. Anderson
and Genicot (2015) find an increase in both female and male suicide rates, but a decrease
in the difference between female and male suicide rates with an increase in female property
rights. Rosenblum (2015) presents a model showing that an increase in women’s inheritance
rights increases the costs of daughters and empirically finds an increase in female mortality
with an increase in female inheritance rights.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a top priority among both developed
and developing countries, having been discussed heavily at the 71st United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. With female primary school completion rates in India below the rates of
1One explanation for this is discussed in Brulé (2012), where the increase in affected women’s bargaining
power causes an increase in local female political participation, which increases rights for all women in these
areas. As qualifying women increase their political representation, spillover effects might cause educational
attainment to increase and labor force participation to decrease for all children, but much more drastically
for children directly affected by the reform.
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male children, policies that increase the ability for female children to complete school are
necessary. Achieving equal primary and secondary school completion rates requires more
than increasing access to schools. It is necessary to provide incentives for parents to invest
in both female and male children. Based on a nationally representative sample, results pre-
sented in this paper strongly suggest that increased female inheritance rights increase female
children’s educational outcomes without decreasing male children’s educational outcomes.
1.2 Hindu Succession Act
This paper examines the effects of reforms to inheritance laws enacted in four states
between the years 1986 and 1994. To understand the nature of these reforms, some back-
ground is necessary. Property in India is divided into two categories: (1) joint family
property and (2) separate property. The bulk of Indian family wealth is comprised of joint
family property, which includes ancestral property, mainly land, as well as property pur-
chased during marriage that was merged into the joint property (Agarwal 1994).2 Prior to
the 1986-1994 reforms, joint property could be inherited only by male members of a dy-
nasty, the inheritor being called a coparcenary (Deininger, Goyal, and Nagaranjan, 2013).
Separate property consists of assets either purchased during the marriage and maintained
as such (that is, not merged into the joint property) or assets inherited from someone other
than a male ancestor.
In the interim between India’s independence in 1947 and the Hindu Succession Act
of 1956 (HSA 1956), women in India could inherit neither joint property nor separate
property.3 The HSA 1956 lifted a number of restrictions on Hindu women’s inheritance
rights in every state except Jammu & Kashmir, the majority-Muslim state. It provided
women full ownership rights with respect to separate property when a male relative died
intestate, but continued to exclude women from inheriting joint property.4 The HSA 1956
2According to data from the 1999 Rural Economic and Demographic Survey, 84 percent of household
wealth is comprised of ancestral, joint property.
3Prior to the Act, Hindu women enjoyed only “limited ownership” rights, which gave them the right of
possession and enjoyment but no legal title and no right to sell.
4Deininger, Goyal, and Nagarajan (2013) estimate that 65 percent of individuals die intes-
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covers 86 percent of the Indian population.5
Thirty years after passage of the HSA 1956, the state of Andhra Pradesh reformed
its inheritance laws to permit women to inherit joint property, followed by Tamil Nadu
(1989), Karnataka (1994), and Maharashtra (1994).6,7 To be affected by these HSA 1956
state amendments, the law requires a woman to be unmarried at the time of the reform,
the daughter of a household head who was still alive and owned land, born in the state of
the reform, and of the Hindu religion.
My main subject of inquiry is the shift in inheritance rights through the HSA 1956
reforms. I create a variable, reformactive, that indicates whether or not a amendment
has passed (reform is active) at the time of survey. For example, the reform is active if
an individual lived in Andhra Pradesh after 1986. This would include observations from
the state of Andhra Pradesh in years 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2004. On the other hand,
observations from Andhra Pradesh in 1983 (the first year of data) would not be active
because in 1983 in Andhra Pradesh there was not yet an amendment in place.
Other key laws which pertain directly to women in India include the Dowry Prohi-
bition Act, the Child Marriage Act, the Prevention of Sati, the Hindu Marriage Act, the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, and the State Commission for Women
Act. All but the last act do not vary at the state level. Anderson and Genicot (2015)
demonstrate that the timing of the HSA 1956 state amendments is not correlated with
these laws. As of the 2005 Hindu Succession Amendment Act, all states (except Jammu &
Kashmir) provide equal inheritance rights of both joint and separate property to male and
female children.
tate, with higher percentages in rural areas. Roy (2013) presents anecdotal evidence that the
percentage could be as high as 80 percent (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Avoid-disputes-write-a-
Will/articleshow/802650.cms; http://www.fpgindia.org/2011/07/writing-a-will-know-some-facts.html).
5Hindu citizens make up 80.5 percent of the population (Census 2001). The law also applies to Buddhist,
Jain, and Sikh women, reference to whom is omitted for the purpose of exposition.
6Andhra Pradesh was not the first state to reform its inheritance laws. Kerala abolished joint family
property entirely in 1976, seven years prior to the start of my data in 1983. I therefore eliminate Kerala
from my sample.
7Anderson and Genicot (2015) find no systematic reason for the specific years in which these states
enacted their amendments. There was not a particular party in power in all of these states at the time of
the law change, suggesting no higher average pro-female bias (Rosenblum, 2015).
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1.3 The Relationship Between Education and Labor Out-
comes and State Law
The main outcome of interest in this paper is educational attainment, measured
through primary and secondary school completion. IPUMS India defines primary school
completion equal to five years of schooling, lower secondary equaling eight years of schooling
completed, and secondary equaling the completion of ten years of schooling. The World
Bank provides primary school completion rates for two of the five years of data available
in the IPUMS India dataset. In 1987 the primary school completion rate was 63 percent
and in 1999 the primary school completion rate had increased to 70 percent. In my child
sample, defined as ages 10-14, primary school completion rate was 46 and 56 percent in
1987 and 1999, respectively. Thus the rates in IPUMS India appear to be lower than the
rates calculated by the World Bank. However, the World Bank calculates primary school
completion by dividing the number of new entrants in the last grade of primary education,
regardless of age, by the population at the entrance age for the last grade of primary
education (and multiplying by 100). In contrast, IPUMS India focuses on whether or not
an individual has completed the last year of primary education, and therefore does not
include children who are merely enrolled at that level.
The second outcome of interest is labor force participation. According to the In-
ternational Labor Organization (ILO), child labor is defined as any “work that deprives
children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, and that is harmful to physical
and mental development.” Child labor statistics vary drastically across reporting organiza-
tions due to the difficulty of defining child labor.8 In India, the two major official sources of
data on child employment are the National Sample Survey and the Indian National Census.
The 1991 Census estimates that 10.4 percent of the child population between ages 10-14
participated in the labor force. In 2001, this number decreased to 8.7 percent of children
8Some countries use ILO’s definition, while some exclude children who attend school, others include
children working in domestic work in their own household, while several attempt to weigh working conditions
into their definition.
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between ages 10-14. Child labor force participation has been declining over time, with a
sharper decline occurring in reform states. In this paper, I define child labor as an individ-
ual between ages 10-14 who participates in any form of employment, excluding housework.
The IPUMS India dataset classifies 8.8 percent (29,428 children) in the sample as child
workers. If I include housework, the labor force participation rate increases to 16.6 percent
(55,071 children) of the sample. These numbers are consistent with national estimates of
child labor.
India has enacted many policies that address child labor. The Factories Act of 1948
prohibits employment of children below the age of 14 in factories. The Mines Act of 1952
prohibits employment of individuals below the age of 18 in the mines. The Child Labor
Act of 1986 prohibits employment of children below the age of 14 in hazardous occupations.
Most recently India has adopted the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act in 2000 and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act of 2009.
I hypothesize that with improved property rights, movements toward higher educational
attainment and lower child labor force participation will accelerate at a faster pace for those
individuals affected by the HSA 1956 state amendments. The implied assumption is that
adult females acquire greater bargaining powers as a result of inheritance rights conveyed to
them by the state amendments, and they exploit these powers to effect favorable outcomes
for their children.
One must be cautious when estimating the effect of the HSA 1956 amendments on
child outcomes as these amendments are potentially endogenous. Researchers who do not
take this into account are mis-estimating the effect of the law.9 Figure 1.1 illustrates primary
school completion rates and child labor force participation rates over the sample period for
each reform state separately and nonreform states. Solid vertical lines at years 1986, 1989,
and 1994 indicate the year the reform passed in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Kar-
nataka and Maharashtra, respectively. The data suggest that primary school completion
rates were higher in reform states relative to nonreform states prior to the passing of the
9Previous researchers argue that the timing of the reforms are exogenous rather than the reforms them-
selves (Deininger, Goyal, and Nagaranjan, 2013; Roy, 2013; Anderson and Genicot, 2015; Rosenblum, 2015).
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amendments.10 Child labor force participation rates in reform states were initially higher
than nonreform states.11 These differences in outcomes prior to the passing of the laws sug-
gest that the reforms may be endogenous. To identify the effect of the reforms, I use a triple
difference identification strategy described in Section 1.5. The triple difference strategy will
entail estimation of three distinct models that extend the difference-in-difference model.
First, I exploit variation across states in the density of Hindu populations to estimate the
difference in outcomes between Hindu and non-Hindu households. This is motivated by the
fact that amendments to the HSA 1956 apply only indirectly to households that are not
Hindu. Second, I estimate effects on children distinguished by gender, since the amend-
ments were explicitly targeted at inheritance rights of females. Third, since inheritance
rights for land are of more economic importance in farming regions, I estimate a model that
identifies the marginal effects for children in rural as opposed to urban areas. The triple dif-
ference results, discussed in Section 1.7, suggest the presence of significant marginal effects
for Hindus and rural households, and to a lesser extent for female children.
1.4 Data Description
The dataset used in this analysis is provided by the Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series (IPUMS) - International. This cross-sectional database includes Indian data
from the years 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2004. Each sample consists of between 115,409
and 129,060 household records and between 564,740 and 667,848 person records. Some of
the key variables available include: age, gender, religion, urban-rural status, educational
attainment, literacy, employment status, income, parental information (education, age, in-
come), and migration status. Observations are available from every Indian state and union
territory.12 In total, IPUMS India has 3,055,603 individual observations. Data are available
10Andhra Pradesh is the only reform state with a primary school completion rate that is not significantly
different from nonreform states in 1983.
11Maharashtra is the only reform state with a child labor force participation rate that is not significantly
different from nonreform states in 1983.
12A union territory is a type of administrative division in the Republic of India ruled by the central
government rather than a state elected government.
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at the state and region level, covering all 36 states and union territories and 79 regions.
I eliminate the state Jammu & Kashmir, where the HSA 1956 does not apply (Agar-
wal 1994). This is the only state with a majority Muslim population and is governed by
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). I also drop all observations from Kerala because Kerala has
traditionally been a matrilineal society, where land is inherited through the female line.13
This leaves me with 34 states and union territories.
I define Hindu equal to one if an individual is of the Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh
religion and zero otherwise. A child is defined as any individual between the ages 10-14
which encompasses the majority of working children. In addition, I define an older subset
of children as individuals between the ages 15-19 and adults as individuals between the ages
15-34. The child and older child samples are the individuals most directly affected by the
law changes because they likely consist of daughters in amendment passing (reform) states
who are unmarried.14 I drop individuals whose mothers are older than 54 years to avoid
picking up an effect due to generational changes.
My main sample consists of 332,732 children between the ages 10-14. Summary
statistics for these children are presented in Table 1.1. Summary statistics for older chil-
dren (ages 15-19) and adults (ages 15-34) are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2,
respectively. The average age of children in Table 1.1 is 11.84 years old. Females represent
47 percent of the sample and 66 percent of the households are rural. Fifty one percent of
the child sample has completed primary education and 8.8 percent are currently employed.
Table 1.2 presents child summary statistics for reform states and nonreform states
separately in the year 1983, prior to inception of reforms. The table reveals modest dif-
ferences between children in reform and nonreform states, suggesting that the laws may
not be exogenous. The average number of female children is significantly larger in reform
states and children are more likely to be living in urban areas of reform states. While pri-
13Kerala has the highest literacy rate in India, the highest life expectancy for both males and females,
and its fertility rate and infant mortality rate are among the best in the country. Results including Kerala
are available upon request.
14The average age of marriage for females in India has steadily increased from 23.4 years old in 1981 to
26 years old in 2011.
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mary school completion is significantly higher for children in reform states, enrollment and
literacy rates are similar between reform and nonreform states.15 In reform states before in-
ception of reforms, 20 percent of children were employed (excluding housework), while only
12.7 percent were employed in nonreform states. By 2004 only 5.7 percent of children living
in reform states were employed, while 4.3 percent of children living in nonreform states
were employed. While there is a decrease in both reform and nonreform states, the large
and significant difference in magnitude suggests that the passing of these reforms impacted
child labor to a greater extent than other movements that were directed toward all children
in all states. Mothers are younger and more likely to have completed primary education
on average in reform states. Fathers are older and more likely to have completed primary
education in reform states.
1.5 Empirical Model
The identification assumption is that educational attainment and child labor trends
would have been the same over time if not for the HSA 1956 amendments. A difference-
in-difference strategy between states over time determines the effect of the reform on child
outcomes, both through educational attainment and labor force participation rates, as-
suming the timing of the laws are exogenous. A triple difference strategy extends the
difference-in-difference model and exploits variations within states to estimate the effect of
the reform on children directly covered by the law: Hindu children, female children, and
children living in rural areas.
I estimate outcomes for four dependent variables: primary schooling (whether or not
an individual has completed at least five years of education); secondary schooling (whether
or not an individual has completed at least ten years of education); labor force participation
excluding housework; and labor force participation including housework. Child labor is
typically underestimated due to the fact that much of child labor is found in the informal
15The average number of children without any schooling is also not statistically different between reform
and nonreform states.
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sector and parents do not always include working on family land as participating in the
labor force.16 Consequently, I model labor force participation inclusive of housework as a
robustness check. This robustness check provides me with a bound of the effect of the HSA
1956 state amendments on child labor.
The difference-in-difference approach tests the effect of the reform on the treated
group, specifically individuals living in a reform state after the reform passed, relative
to a control group. I call the treated group active to clarify between an observation in
a reform state before the reform passed (inactive and unaffected) and an observation in
the same reform state after the reform passed (active and affected). For example, in the
1993 observations, individuals living in Andhra Pradesh, where reform passed in 1986, and
Tamil Nadu, where reform passed in 1989, would be active and all other individuals would
be part of the inactive control group. I exploit the variation in the specific timing of these
amendments within each state and estimate the following equation:
yist = β0 + β1reformactivest +Xistβ2 + β3states + β4yeart + εist (1.1)
The dependent variable, yist, denotes either educational attainment (primary school com-
pletion or secondary school completion) or labor force participation for individual i in
state s in year t. State and year controls are captured in states and yeart, respectively.
reformactivest is a dummy indicating whether the reform was active at the time of the
survey. Xist is a vector of individual-level control variables that potentially affect child out-
comes: place of residence (rural/urban), age, age squared, gender, religion, parents’ ages,
parents’ educational attainments, and parents’ weekly wages (to capture wealth). εist is
the error term. The standard errors are clustered at the state level to address within state
correlation concerns and to allow for heteroskedasticity. The variable of interest is β1, which
provides the mean effect on child educational attainment and labor force participation when




The difference-in-difference uses nonreform states as a control group to capture
the impact of changes over time which have nothing to do with the reform. As not all
individuals living in a reform state are directly affected by the amendment, I address the
issue of changes within an active reform state that are not a result of the passing of the
reform using a difference-in-difference-in-difference (triple difference) identification strategy.
This allows me to estimate the effect of the reform on those individuals who are directly
affected by the amendment. I estimate three separate triple differences, one focusing on
Hindu versus non-Hindu outcomes, one focusing on female versus male outcomes, and the
final focusing on rural versus urban outcomes. The following equation represents these three
equations:
yist = β0 + β1Zist + β2reformactivest + β3Zist × reformactiveist +Xistβ4
+β5states + β6yeart + β7state× yearst + εist (1.2)
Similar to the difference-in-difference, the dependent variable, yist, denotes either educa-
tional attainment or labor force participation for individual i in state s in year t. The
equation also includes states, yeart, and state×yearst controls. The variable Zist addresses
each of the three triple differences. In the Hindu versus non-Hindu triple difference, it is a
dummy indicating whether individual i is Hindu. In the female versus male triple difference,
it is a dummy indicating whether individual i is female. In the rural versus urban triple
difference, it is a dummy indicating whether individual i lives in a rural area. As in equation
(1.1) reformactivest is a dummy indicating whether the reform was active at the time of
the survey, and Zist ×reformactiveist is the interaction of Z and reformactive. As before,
Xist is the vector of individual-level control variables that would affect child outcomes listed
above, and εist is the error term. Again, the standard errors are clustered at the state level
to address within state correlation concerns and to allow for heteroskedasticity.
In this estimation I am interested in the additional effect on child educational at-
tainment and labor force participation when an individual is exposed to the change in
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inheritance rights for Hindu children, female children, and children living in rural areas.
The parameter β3 captures the additional effect for Hindu compared to non-Hindu chil-
dren in active reform states, female compared to male children in active reform states, and
children living in rural compared to urban areas in active reform states. In the empirical
analysis to follow, each of these phenomena is addressed in a separate estimation.
One factor that might confound these results is reform-induced migration. The
possibility exists that individuals or households might react to state reforms by migrating
to states with favorable inheritance laws. The evidence indicates, however, that this is
not an item for concern. Census estimates for 2001 (well after the reform period) indicate
that the proportion of female interstate migrants is less than ten percent. In the IPUMS
data, the proportion of migrants between states is less than five percent. Roy (2013)
reports a proportion of 3.4 percent, based on the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey
1999 dataset, again after the reform period of 1986-1994. It appears, therefore, that the
preponderance of migration, to the extent it exists at all, occurs within states and is not an
item of strong concern for this study.
1.6 Difference-in-Difference Results
Using Equation 1.1, I present difference-in-difference results in Table 1.3 of the effect
of an increase in female inheritance rights on the probability of primary school completion
for children between the ages 10-14. Table 1.4 presents corresponding estimates for child
labor force participation. All estimates include controls for states and years, as indicated in
equation (1.1). Those estimates are not shown in Tables 1.3 or 1.4, nor in the tables that
follow. Column 1 presents results including age, gender, state, and year controls. Column
2 includes additional rural and Hindu controls. Column 3 adds parental controls (age,
primary school completion, and weekly wages). Columns 4 and 5 separate the sample by
gender, columns 6 and 7 separate the sample by religion, and columns 8 and 9 separate the
sample by rural-urban status.
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The estimated reform parameter in Column 3 indicates that an increase in female
inheritance rights increases the probability of primary school completion in active reform
states by 5.79 percentage points. The point estimates are similar across all specifications.
When the sample is partitioned by gender (Columns 4 and 5), I find that an increase in
female inheritance rights increases the probability of primary school completion by 6.63
and 4.89 percentage points for female and male children, respectively. The relatively small
standard errors indicate that the estimates are strongly significant. The magnitude of the
effect is larger for the female sample, who are directly affected by the reforms. These results
support the hypothesis that there will be a larger increase in female children’s educational
attainment but both genders will experience increases due to the fact that, even though
daughters are the ones directly affected by the reform, women with greater property rights
increase educational investment for all children.
Dividing the sample by religion (Columns 6 and 7), I find an increase in the proba-
bility of primary school completion by 5.95 (4.46) percentage points for Hindu (non-Hindu)
children. This is noteworthy, because non-Hindus are not directly affected by the reforms.
An increase in both Hindu and non-Hindu educational attainment supports Brulé’s (2012)
theory that local female political participation produces a spillover effect for all children.
Columns 8 and 9 present results for rural and urban households separately. I find
an increase in the probability of primary school completion by 8.58 and 4.26 percentage
points for children living in rural and urban areas, respectively. Children living in rural
areas are expected to experience a larger effect when living in a reform state as the amount
of inheritable land is substantial in rural areas. The results found support this expectation.
It is useful to view these point estimates in the context of the larger population.
The overall primary school completion rate among children aged 10-14 is approximately 51
percent (Table 1.1). Among females, the rate is 47 percent, compared to 54 percent for males
(not shown in Table 1.1). Thus, using for example the estimate in column 3 (β̂ = 0.0579),
or a marginal effect of 5.8 percentage points, the reforms effects are to increase primary
school completion by 11 percent among boys aged 10-14 and by 12 percent among girls.
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Using the gender specific estimates in columns 4 and 5 these effects are 14 percent among
girls and 9 percent among boys. In any case, the reform-induced outcomes appear to be
quantitatively meaningful.
Appendix Table A3 presents the effect of an increase in female inheritance rights on
the probability of secondary school completion for children between the ages 15-19. Sec-
ondary school completion includes individuals who have completed ten years of education.
I observe a 5.54 percentage point increase in the probability of secondary school completion
for 15-19 year old children in active reform states. Female children experience a slightly
higher increase in the probability of secondary school completion when compared to male
children (5.76 percentage points versus 5.35 percentage points). I observe a significant 5.79
percentage point increase in the probability of secondary school completion for Hindu in-
dividuals. There is no significant change for non-Hindus, who are not directly affected by
the reform. Children living in rural areas experience a 7.89 percentage point increase in the
probability of secondary school completion, while children living in urban areas experience
a smaller, insignificant increase.
The final difference-in-difference results presented analyze the effect of an increase
in female inheritance rights on the probability of labor force participation for children be-
tween the ages 10-14. These results are presented in Table 1.4. Recall child labor excludes
housework.17 The results indicate that living in an active reform state decreases the prob-
ability of child labor force participation by 2.79 percentage points. Again, these results
are similar with or without additional controls, indicating that the decrease in child labor
force participation is being driven by the reforms. Separating the sample by gender, I find
a larger decrease in the probability of labor force participation for female children than
male children (2.93 percentage points and 2.76 percentage points, respectively). It is again
useful to place the employment effects in the context of the labor market in India. For the
population of children aged 10-14, the proportion employed is estimated to be 8.8 percent
(Table 1.1). The proportions by gender are 7.7 percent and 9.8 percent for females and
17Results including housework in the child labor measure are presented in Appendix Table A4.
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males, respectively. From that frame of reference, the estimated effect of reform for females
(β̂ = −0.0293: Table 1.4, Column 4) suggests that the reforms induced a reduction in child
labor force participation of 31 percent for females. For males (β̂ = −0.0276: Table 1.4,
Column 5), the implied decline is 28 percent.
Both Hindu and non-Hindu children experience a decrease in the probability of child
labor force participation (2.53 percentage points and 3.30 percentage points, respectively).
Children living in rural and urban areas experience a 4.56 and 1.74 percentage point decrease
in the probability of participating in the labor force, respectively.
The difference-in-difference results suggest that living in an active reform state in-
creases the probability of primary school completion and decreases the probability of child
labor force participation. However, finding significant effects for children not directly af-
fected by the law (male children, non-Hindu children, and children living in urban areas)
suggests either the reforms cause a spillover effect for individuals not directly affected by
the reforms or the reform variable is picking up a general “reformist” tendency. Assum-
ing reformist tendencies remain constant, differences in how the laws affect: (1) females
and males; (2) Hindus and non-Hindus; and (3) rural and urban residents, estimated using
a triple difference strategy, allow me to identify the direct effect of the laws and further
validate the results.
1.7 Triple Difference Results
A triple difference estimation is used to narrow in on individuals who were directly
affected by the reform. The triple difference framework is described in equation (1.2). It
extends the difference-in-difference model, equation (1.1), by incorporating three potentially
important background variables in the model. These variables, represented by Zist in equa-
tion (1.2), enter the model as both main effects and, to capture the higher-order difference,
interactions with reformactiveist. As described in Section 1.5, the variables of interest are
dichotomous indicators of (1) Hindu versus non-Hindu religion; (2) female versus male; and
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(3) rural versus urban residence. Hindu families are those to which the reforms pertains
to and thus should experience a larger effect. Female children experience a direct effect
when they receive an increase in inheritance rights, while male children experience only an
indirect effect through the change in their mother’s inheritance rights. Rural residents are
anticipated to experience a larger effect due to the fact that rural households own more
agricultural land, which is of high value to individuals who have the opportunity to inherit
this land.
To examine the potential triple difference effects, I estimate equation (1.2) separately
for each of the Hindu, gender, and place of residence interaction terms. Results for the school
completion model are presented in Table 1.5. Columns 1, 4, and 7 present results including
age, gender, state, year, and state × year controls. Columns 2, 5, and 8 present results
including additional rural and Hindu controls. Columns 3, 6, and 9 add parental controls.
I find that Hindu children living in a state that increases female inheritance rights
experience an additional increase in the probability of primary school completion by 3.26
percentage points (Column 3 of Table 1.5). All specifications are similar in magnitude.
This supports the hypothesis that there is a larger effect on Hindu children’s educational
attainment due to the reforms that directly affected Hindu individuals only.
Comparing female to male children, column 6 suggests an additional 1.77 percentage
point increase in the probability of primary school completion for female children. This
result is insignificant but of similar magnitude as specifications excluding parental controls,
which are significant. Recall that daughters are directly affected by the reform, and therefore
female children are predicted to be impacted more than male children.
Analyzing the additional effect of an increase in female inheritance rights on children
living in rural areas (Column 9), I find that living in active reform states increases the
probability of primary school completion by an additional 2.85 percentage points for children
living in rural areas. These results are robust to all three specifications. Children in rural
areas typically complete primary education at a lower rate than urban children (44.25
percent average completion rate compared to 62.93 percent) and rural children are believed
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to have more to gain with an increase in female inheritance rights due to access to more
agricultural land. These results imply that the reform impacts rural children more than
urban children.
Secondary school completion results are presented in Appendix Table A5 for chil-
dren ages 15-19. Hindu children living in a state that increases female inheritance rights
experience an additional 1.77 percentage point increase in the probability of secondary
school completion (Column 3). Female children living in a state that increases female in-
heritance rights experience an additional 0.19 percentage point increase in the probability
of secondary school completion (Column 6). Children living in a rural area of a state that
increases female inheritance rights experience an additional 3.91 percentage point increase
in the probability of secondary school completion (Column 9). These results are consistent
with the results above analyzing primary school completion for children ages 10-14.
Table 1.6 estimates the triple difference effect of an increase in female inheritance
rights on the probability of labor force participation for children ages 10-14. Hindu children
living in active reform states are found to experience an additional 0.66 percentage point
decrease in the probability of participating in child labor (Column 3). Results using fewer
controls are larger in magnitude and significant. These results suggest that Hindu children’s
labor force participation is more affected by the reform than non-Hindu children’s labor force
participation, but these results are not as robust as the results obtained when analyzing
educational attainment (Table 1.5).
Analyzing the additional effect of increased female inheritance rights on the prob-
ability of labor force participation for female children (Columns 4-6) returns insignificant
additional decreases, regardless of the controls included. As female children participate less
in the labor force than male children, this insignificant difference is unsurprising.
The final estimation analyzes the additional effect of increased female inheritance
rights on the probability of labor force participation for children living in rural areas
(Columns 7-9). I find that children living in rural areas experience an additional 2.11 per-
centage point decrease in the probability of participating in the labor force. The estimates
18
are significant in all three specifications. Rural children’s average labor force participation
is 10.8 percent, while only 5.18 percent of urban children are reported as working. These
results are consistent with the primary school completion results in Table 1.5. As a child
allocates more of their time to schooling, they have less time available to participate in the
labor force.
Appendix Table A6 includes housework as part of child labor. The results found in
these regressions support the results presented in Table 1.6 as described above.
1.8 Conclusion
I exploit variations in the timing of changes in female inheritance laws in India
to analyze the effects of an increase in female inheritance rights, which promote gender
equality, on primary school completion rates and child labor force participation. Using a
difference-in-difference approach, I am able to take advantage of the time varying aspect
of the passing of these amendments in four Indian states. I compare the probability of
primary school completion of 10-14 year old children in active reform states to children
in inactive, nonreform states and find that the probability of primary school completion
increases by 5.79 percentage points. Female children, who are directly affected by these
reforms, experience a larger increase in the probability of primary school completion than
male children (6.63 percentage points versus 4.89 percentage points). Hindu children ex-
perience a larger increase in the probability of primary school completion than non-Hindu
children (5.95 percentage points compared to 4.46 percentage points). Children living in
rural areas experience a larger increase in the probability of primary school completion than
children living in urban areas (8.58 percentage points versus 4.26 percentage points).
Additionally, I analyze the effect of an increase in female inheritance rights on the
probability of child labor force participation for children ages 10-14 using the the same
treated and control groups presented above. I find a significant 2.79 percentage point de-
crease in the probability of labor force participation for children living in active reform
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states compared to children living in inactive states. Female children experience a similar
decrease in the probability of child labor force participation as male children (2.93 per-
centage point decrease and 2.76 percentage point decrease, respectively). Hindu children
experience a smaller decrease in the probability of labor force participation than non-Hindu
children (2.53 percentage point decrease and 3.30 percentage point decrease, respectively).
Children living in rural areas experience a larger decrease in the probability of labor force
participation than children living in urban areas (4.56 percentage point decrease and 1.74
percentage point decrease, respectively).
A triple difference analysis is performed to support the results found in the difference-
in-difference analysis and to further understand the direct effect of the laws. The results
suggest that an increase in female inheritance rights increases the probability of primary
school completion and decreases the probability of labor force participation at a larger
magnitude for children directly affected by the reform, but spillover effects are present for
children indirectly affected by the reform.
The results found in this paper suggest a strong argument for enforcing equal inher-
itance rights to both sons and daughters, as children of both genders benefit when female
inheritance rights increase. With the passing of the 2005 Hindu Succession Amendment
Act, which provides all Hindu children equal coparcenary rights in all Indian states (except
Jammu & Kashmir) I expect to see a more rapid increase in educational outcomes and
decrease in child labor force participation in all states, similar to the results found in the
states that passed reforms prior to the nation wide amendment.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics: Children Ages 10-14
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Age 11.842 1.432 332732
Female 0.467 0.499 332723
Rural 0.658 0.474 332732
Hindu 0.810 0.392 332539
Currently Enrolled 0.732 0.443 331632
Literate 0.802 0.398 332214
No Schooling 0.213 0.409 332214
Primary Completed 0.506 0.500 332214
Employed 0.088 0.284 332570
Employed (incl. Housework) 0.166 0.372 332570
Weekly Wages (2010 Rupees) 7.621 181.965 332562
Mother’s Age 37.043 6.080 305584
Mother Completed Primary 0.292 0.454 305374
Mother’s Weekly Wages (2010 Rupees) 75.855 1217.506 305455
Father’s Age 42.615 7.152 285608
Father Completed Primary 0.512 0.500 285431


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Probability of Primary School Completion:
Triple Difference
Effect of Religion, Gender, & Rural Status
Children Ages 10-14
Hindu Female Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hindu * Reform Active 0.0363 0.0409* 0.0326*
(0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0190)
Female * Reform Active 0.0214* 0.0185* 0.0177
(0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0114)
Rural * Reform Active 0.0315*** 0.0293*** 0.0285***
(0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0103)
Reform Active 0.0576*** 0.0572** 0.0779*** 0.0782*** 0.0794*** 0.0989*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.140***
(0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0177) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0095)
Age 0.620*** 0.615*** 0.604*** 0.622*** 0.615*** 0.604*** 0.616*** 0.615*** 0.604***
(0.0647) (0.0644) (0.0710) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0707) (0.0638) (0.0643) (0.0709)
Age Squared -0.0213*** -0.0211*** -0.0207*** -0.0214*** -0.0211*** -0.0207*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.0207***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Female -0.0683*** -0.0691*** -0.0699*** -0.0860*** -0.0835*** -0.0879*** -0.0691*** -0.0688*** -0.0697***
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0093) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0094)
Hindu 0.151*** 0.160*** 0.136*** 0.0967*** 0.0592*** 0.100*** 0.0626***
(0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0243) (0.0124) (0.0236) (0.0123)
Rural -0.155*** -0.0623*** -0.157*** -0.0619*** -0.226*** -0.227*** -0.114***
(0.0102) (0.0066) (0.0110) (0.0070) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0143)
Mother’s Age 0.000694 0.000751 0.000954**
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Mother Completed Primary 0.153*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0096)
Mother’s Weekly Wages -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.0000009
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Father’s Age 0.00137*** 0.00132** 0.00120**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Father Completed Primary 0.214*** 0.216*** 0.212***
(0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0097)
Father’s Weekly Wages 0.000002*** 0.000002*** 0.000002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Average Primary School Completion 0.506 0.506 0.515 0.506 0.506 0.515 0.506 0.506 0.515
N 332019 332019 277253 332212 332019 277253 332212 332019 277253
R2 0.203 0.222 0.310 0.198 0.221 0.311 0.219 0.224 0.312
Notes: All columns include state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in paren-
theses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table 1.6: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Probability of Child Labor:
Triple Difference
Effect of Religion, Gender, & Rural Status
Children Ages 10-14
hindu female rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hindu * Reform Active -0.0155 -0.0174* -0.00656
(0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0078)
Female * Reform Active -0.00240 -0.00169 -0.00227
(0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0124)
Rural * Reform Active -0.0264** -0.0260** -0.0211**
(0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0100)
Reform Active -0.0742*** -0.0740*** -0.0896*** -0.0840*** -0.0858*** -0.0929*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.114***
(0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0090) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Age -0.0375*** -0.0351** -0.0341** -0.0383*** -0.0357*** -0.0343** -0.0354** -0.0350** -0.0342**
(0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0133)
Age Squared 0.00271*** 0.00264*** 0.00253*** 0.00274*** 0.00266*** 0.00254*** 0.00265*** 0.00263*** 0.00253***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Female -0.0227*** -0.0223*** -0.0177** -0.00574 -0.00682 -0.00707 -0.0224*** -0.0225*** -0.0178**
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0073)
Hindu -0.0965*** -0.100*** -0.0592*** -0.0127 -0.00207 -0.0182*** -0.00739
(0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0046)
Rural 0.0645*** 0.0411*** 0.0654*** 0.0414*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.0693***
(0.0122) (0.0083) (0.0123) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0080)
Mother’s Age 0.0000202 -0.00000509 -0.0000292
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Mother Completed Primary -0.0284*** -0.0288*** -0.0291***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042)
Mother’s Weekly Wages 0.0000005 0.0000005 0.0000004
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Father’s Age 0.000114 0.000144 0.000125
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Father Completed Primary -0.0717*** -0.0724*** -0.0689***
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0076)
Father’s Weekly Wages -0.0000009** -0.0000009** -0.0000010**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Average Employment 0.0885 0.0885 0.0799 0.0885 0.0885 0.0799 0.0885 0.0885 0.0799
N 332444 332444 277623 332561 332444 277623 332561 332444 277623
R2 0.0641 0.0745 0.0994 0.0657 0.0767 0.102 0.0822 0.0828 0.107
Notes: All columns include state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in paren-
theses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Figure 1.1: Primary School Completion & Child Labor
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Durable Goods on
Child Outcomes: Evidence from
China
2.1 Introduction
The allocation of time within a household has been widely discussed since Becker’s
seminal work (1965). Recent literature has incorporated time-saving appliance ownership
into Becker’s model to attempt to explain increases in female labor force participation
(Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2005) and this model has been empirically tested
with data from the United States (Coen-Pirani, León, and Lugauer, 2010) and China
(Tewari and Wang, 2016). The original model has also been adjusted to incorporate chil-
dren’s time allocation in conjunction with parents’ time allocation in a broader family con-
text (Skoufias, 1993). I combine the models of previous authors to analyze family appliance
ownership and children’s time allocation.
Household ownership of time-saving durable goods in China has increased dramat-
ically over the last few decades. Washing machine ownership rates exceeded 90% by 2004
after being less than 5% in the 1980s. Chinese refrigerator ownership rates have steadily
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increased from less than 5% in the 1980s to 24% in 1994, most recently reaching 88% in
2014.1 As previous researchers have only studied the effect of time-saving durable goods
on adult female outcomes, finding an increase in the probability of labor force participation
when an adult female lives in a household that owns a time-saving durable good,2 I expand
the analysis to include a larger sample of individuals being affected by the introduction of
a new technology. Since children, and more specifically female children, allocate a large
portion of time to household production,3 it is important to look at the effect of ownership
of time-saving appliances on child outcomes as well.
This paper examines the impact of the diffusion of time-saving household durable
appliances on child outcomes in nine Chinese provinces. Using data from the China Health
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), time-series and cross-sectional variation in household appli-
ance ownership, and multiple child outcomes I find support for the hypothesis that access to
time-saving durable goods contributed to the reallocation of time to leisure and schooling for
older children in China. To address the concern of endogenity of household durable goods
due to unobserved preferences, I instrument household ownership of a time-saving appliance
by the average ownership rate of that appliance among households with no children living
in the same community. Additionally, I use data on household assets and infrastructure to
develop a wealth index through a factor analysis approach in order to control for household
wealth.
I empirically test the model and find that children ages 12-18 living in households
that own a time-saving appliance experience a decrease in average time dedicated to house-
work, have a higher probability of being enrolled in school, and have a lower probability of
1http://www.economist.com/news/international/21603031-how-chilled-food-changing-lives-cool-
developments; http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/Appliances.pdf
2Some articles that analyze appliance ownership include: Cardia (2008), Coen-Pirani, León, and Lugauer
(2010), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), and Tewari and Wang (2016). Dinkleman (2011) finds
that electrification, which is necessary for most appliances, significantly raises female employment within
five years.
3See Skoufias (1993). In the CHNS dataset women between the ages 19-44 spend an average of 581.5
minutes per week (roughly 9.7 hours) performing housework. Males between 19-44 years old spend an
average of 124.7 minutes per week (roughly 2 hours) on housework. Male and female children between 12-18
years old spend 45.9 minutes per week (less than one hour) and 132.7 minutes per week (roughly 2.2 hours)
on housework, respectively.
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being employed. These results are largest for females, who experience a 187 minute decrease
in average time dedicated to housework per week and a 17.8 percentage point increase in
the probability of being enrolled when living in a household that owns a washing machine.
Both genders experience a significant decrease in the probability of being employed when
living in a household that owns a time-saving appliance. Results support the predictions
obtained through the time allocation model, with an increase in the presence of time-saving
appliances providing children the opportunity to reallocate their time from housework to
other time-using activities. The model predicts that time allocated to both housework and
employment for a child may decrease if time dedicated to other activities, such as schooling
and leisure, increase by a similar magnitude. I find a smaller magnitude increase in the
probability of being enrolled than the decrease found in the probability of being employed
but am unable to estimate the change in time dedicated to leisure activities. Additionally,
if child labor is viewed as a negative outcome and I consider the time allocation of the full
family unit, a decrease in time allocated to housework and an increase in time dedicated
to market work for mothers due to the presence of time-saving appliances would cause a
decrease in both the time dedicated to housework and the probability of being employed
for children, which is consistent with the findings in this paper.4
Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a top priority among both devel-
oped and developing countries, being discussed heavily at the 71st United Nations General
Assembly.5 One past Millennial Development Goal was to reach boys and girls parity at
the primary school level. With this goal being achieved in many countries, providing girls
secondary education is the next step. Policymakers believe secondary education for female
children is an “enormous lever” for economic success.6 Achieving this goal requires more
than increasing access to secondary schools, but also releasing daughters from their duties
at home. Observing a handful of household activities, the results presented in this paper
4Coen-Pirani, León, and Lugauer (2010) and Tewari and Wang (2016) find an increase in adult female
labor force participation when time-saving appliances are purchased. The effect of a mother’s employment
on child outcomes is discussed in Section 2.7.2.




strongly suggest that in order to increase a female child’s secondary enrollment, there must
be a decrease in their obligations within the household. Time-saving appliances are a tool
that provide this decrease in average time dedicated to housework.
2.2 China Background
2.2.1 Education in China
The education system in China consists of five years of primary education, four years
of junior secondary education, and three years of senior secondary education. Children begin
primary education as early as six years old, with many children not enrolling until the age
of seven.
While primary school enrollment rates have always been high, with gross enrollment
above 100 percent from 1989-2011,7 secondary enrollment rates have seen a significant in-
crease over the last 25 years. According to the World Bank, secondary gross enrollment was
38 percent in 1989, which is the first year of data available in the CHNS. This rate increased
to over 86 percent by the last year of data available, in 2011. The “Law of Compulsory
Education” of 1986 provides all children with nine years of compulsory schooling, yet gross
junior secondary completion rate (nine years of schooling) was still at 55 percent in 1991,
reaching 73 percent in 1997, and finally entering the 90 percent range in 2008.
Determinants of school enrollment have been investigated by multiple authors.
Brown and Park (2002) examine the effects of individual, family, and school character-
istics on educational attainment. Connelly and Zheng (2003) use a logit model to analyze
the effect of rural residence, parental education, and family size on enrollment and com-
pletion. Yi et al. (2012) hypothesize that poverty, poor academic performance, and rising
opportunity costs are contributing factors to dropping out.
All three studies agree that a major factor in the decision to attend school is the
7Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age
group that officially corresponds to the primary education level (World Bank Data). Children in poor areas
tend to enroll at older ages, so many 13-15 year old children are in primary school, rather than junior
secondary school, which allows the primary gross enrollment to be higher than 100 percent.
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cost of schooling. Children whose families do not pay school fees are not allowed to attend
school. Brown and Park’s (2002) survey data show that many parents are less willing to
pay for the education of their daughters, with “inability to pay high fees” being the most
frequent response to why female children drop out.8 A household must also consider the
opportunity costs of foregone wages and home production when deciding if a child is to
attend school (Connelly and Zheng, 2003). With an increase in unskilled wages in China,
the opportunity cost of schooling increases, especially for older children. Students older
than 14 have a dropout rate of 37.4 percent, while students younger than 14 have a dropout
rate of 9.1 percent (Yi et al., 2012).
For younger children, Brown and Park (2002) find that the number of siblings de-
creases the probability of dropping out, due to older siblings substituting their household
duties for the younger child’s or these siblings complementing each other through cost sav-
ings and improved learning.
With many factors to consider, the opportunity cost of foregone home production
has not been investigated thoroughly. A child’s time can be divided into four categories:
school, leisure, market work, and home work. In less developed areas, children spend
a great deal of time in home production. Some time-consuming tasks include cooking,
cleaning, doing laundry, and caring for younger children. In the CHNS dataset, older
children spend, on average, an hour and a half every week performing a portion of the
potential household chores.9 The purchase of household durable goods that reduce the
time it takes to perform these tasks provide the opportunity to reallocate a child’s time
to other activities, such as schooling. Appliances of the time-saving nature in the CHNS
dataset include washing machines and kitchen appliances (refrigerators, microwaves, electric
cooking pots, and pressure cookers). I hypothesize that the purchase of time-saving durable
goods will alter children’s time allocation within the household, lowering the opportunity
8The Compulsory Education Law 2006 amendment abolished tuition fees for nine-year compulsory ed-
ucation in rural areas. However, fees are still legal and present for senior secondary education.
9These household chores include: buying food, preparing food, and washing clothes for the household.
This average excludes other probable household duties and is therefore a minimum average number of minutes
per week dedicated to housework.
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cost of attending school and providing them with the opportunity to further their education.
The hypothesized effect of these appliances on children’s employment is ambiguous due to
the fact that these appliances lower the opportunity cost of working for both children and
adult females. Children may increase their labor force participation, but if mother’s are
found to increase their labor force participation a decrease in child labor force participation
is likely to occur.
2.2.2 Appliance Ownership in China
Appliance ownership in China has altered drastically over the last few decades, with
technological advancements, infrastructural improvements, and increases in trade making
household appliances more accessible to rural and low-income households. Between 1989
and 2011 washing machine and refrigerator ownership increased by 45 and 60 percent in
the CHNS dataset, respectively. Ownership of smaller kitchen appliances has increased to
70 percent. Entertainment appliances have also experienced large increases in ownership,
with ownership of color televisions increasing by over 80 percent. Summary statistics from
the CHNS are presented in Section 2.4.
Bowden and Offer (1994) distinguish between two types of household appliances:
time-saving and time-using. Time-saving technologies are those appliances which increase
the quantity of discretionary time by using these goods to perform housework. In the
CHNS dataset, available time-saving appliances include: washing machines, refrigerators,
microwaves, electric cooking pots, and pressure cookers. These goods decrease the time
necessary to wash clothes, purchase food, and prepare food. Time-using goods enhance
the quality of discretionary time and ownership rates of these goods typically increase
at a faster rate than time-saving appliances. Examples of time-using goods in the CHNS
dataset include air conditioners, cameras, color televisions, and electric fans.10 According to
Bowden and Offer (1994), consumers in the United States and Britain give greater priority
10Air conditioners and electric fans may be classified as non-time-altering rather than time-using appli-
ances. However, they increase the quality of time spent in the household and are therefore grouped with
time-using appliances in this discussion.
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to enhancing the quality of discretionary time rather than to increasing its quantity. This
trend appears to be similar in China. One reason for this result is that time-using appliances
affect the satisfaction of all household members, whereas time-saving appliances only affect
the main users of these goods (typically adult females and children). Time-using appliances
are also viewed as status goods and thus acquire higher priority for purchase than time-
saving goods.
When a household purchases time-saving durable goods, individuals have the op-
portunity to reallocate their time to leisure, schooling, or market work. Previous literature
has found that adult females increase their labor force participation and decrease their time
dedicated to home production in China (Tewari and Wang, 2016) and married women’s
labor force participation rates increase in the United States (Coen-Pirani, León, and Lu-
gauer, 2010) with the presence of time-saving appliances in the household. Purchasing
time-saving appliances is found to produce no change in time dedicated to housework for
household members in Australia (Bittman, Rice, and Wajcman, 2004). With an increase
in time-saving appliance ownership, households have additionally increased domestic pro-
duction standards and output, decreased the use of domestic service workers, and added
new tasks to household production. Bittman, Rice, and Wajcman (2004) find that owning
domestic technology rarely reduces unpaid housework. Even if the housework hours remain
the same, the workload becomes easier (Bowden and Offer, 1994). These appliances are an
alternative avenue used to strengthen women’s bargaining power through providing them
more efficient ways to perform tasks they typically partake in, making them more produc-
tive in the household. While it is still unclear if time-saving appliances decrease total time
dedicated to housework, there appears to be a consensus in the literature that these appli-
ances increase productivity within the household. This paper adds to the discussion of the
effect of time-saving appliances on household time allocation by studying children’s time
allocation, which has yet to be explored in previous literature.
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2.3 Theoretical Model
The original model of time allocation was developed by Gary Becker in 1965. It has
since been modified by many authors to understand different aspects of household produc-
tion. Huffman and Lange (1989) develop a model to analyze joint wage-labor participation
and hours decisions of a husband and wife in farm households, determining if the decision
of off-farm labor supply is dependent on a spouse’s off-farm work. Skoufias (1993) uses
the model developed by Huffman and Lange (1989) and includes children to estimate the
inter-relationships between adult male, adult female, and child market wage rates and time
allocated to the market, domestic production, leisure, and schooling. He emphasizes the
importance of the opportunity cost of time in intrafamily time allocation.
Huffman and Lange’s model assumes that household members specialize in activities
in which they have a comparative advantage in order to maximize family welfare (theory
of the family (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974); household time allocation (Becker, 1965;
Gronau, 1973)). Comparative advantage is determined by the opportunity cost of time of
each household member and relative efficiency in household production of each household
member. Any change in the value of time of a household member relative to that of other
household members will induce a reallocation of time of that household member toward
the activity with the highest reward. Demand functions for time inputs of a household
consisting of an adult male (m), an adult female (f), and a child (c) in activities including
housework (H), market work (M), leisure (L), and schooling (S) are derived by maximizing
the household composite utility function.11 The utility function depends on each household
member’s inputs of housework, leisure, and schooling time (T iH , T iL, T cS), time-saving appli-
ance ownership (A), and goods purchased for direct or indirect consumption (Y ). It also
depends on the adult male, adult female, and child’s human capital (Ei) because of efficiency
or taste effects and other household characteristics (Γ) (i.e. commuting distance to shop-
ping, recreation, schooling center) which are not current choices. This function represents
11Schooling is considered only for the child in the model.
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the characteristics of household preferences as well as household appliance ownership.12
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(2.1)
Conditions for optimal decisions are obtained by maximizing utility subject to time and
budget constraints.
T̄ = T iH + T iM + T iL + T cS ,
i = m, f, c










cT cM + PHH(T iH , A;Ei, φ) − PAA+ V − PY Y = 0 (2.3)
where T̄ is an individual’s endowment of time and wi represents the market wage for indi-
vidual i. PH is the price of household output (H), which is a function of time dedicated to
housework by each household member (T iH), household ownership of time-saving appliances
(A), human capital of each household member (Ei), and other household specific character-
istics (φ). PA is the price of household appliances (A), V represents non-earned household
income, and PY is the price of household consumption goods (Y ). The key household deci-
sion or choice variables in this study are T iH , T iM , and T iS but these variables are determined
jointly with T iL, Y , and A. Interior solutions for leisure time decisions are assumed. See
Huffman and Lange (1989) for a step-by-step calculation of first order equations.
The model shows that each household decision variable is a function of the same set
of exogenous prices, wages, income, and household/individual/community characteristic
variables. Market work is the residual category of time use. The opportunity cost of
allocating time of household member i in housework, leisure, or schooling activities is given
by the market wage rate. The demand functions for household inputs and individual time
12Detailed steps to derive the composite utility function are presented in Huffman and Lange (1989).
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are then presented in Equations 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.
Ω = DfΩ(wm, wf , wc, PA, PH , Em, Ef , Ec, φ);







T i?L = DLi(wm, wf , wc, π, PY , V, Em, Ef , Ec,Γ)





Using detailed data from the CHNS, which describes individual time allocation, enrollment
status, and labor force participation, I empirically estimate this model and test the impli-
cation that as households purchase time-saving durable goods, children will reallocate their
time to leisure, schooling, or market work.
2.4 Data Description
The data are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).13 A nine wave
longitudinal dataset covering 23 years is available across nine provinces which vary substan-
tially in geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators. The
provinces are Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning,
and Shandong.14 Available years of data are 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009,
and 2011. The surveys include individual, household, and community level data. Each
household member’s income, time allocation at home, and economic activities are described
in detail. Information on water sources, condition of the home, and ownership of consumer
durable goods are reported. Full income from both market and nonmarket activities are
imputed. Data on community infrastructure (water, transport, electricity, communications,
13These surveys are conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease
Control and Prevention.
14Heilongjiang was added to the dataset in 1997 when Jiangsu was unable to participate. Jiangsu returned
to the study in 2000.
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etc.), services (family planning and health facilities), and population are available.
This paper focuses on child outcomes, looking at children ages 12-18.15 In my sample
I observe 8,008 individuals, with 15,361 observations over the span of 23 years.16 Summary
statistics are presented in Table 2.1, dividing the sample into children in households that own
a washing machine and children in households that do not own a washing machine.17 The
average age of children in the sample is 15.14 years old, with just under half of the sample
being female and each individual completing 7.7 years of schooling on average. Children in
households that own a washing machine complete 8.4 years of schooling, while children in
households that do not own a washing machine only complete 7.1 years of schooling. The
main variable of interest is whether an individual is currently enrolled in an educational
institution. At the time of the survey, 73 percent of the sample was enrolled in school; 82
percent of children in households that own a washing machine were enrolled, compared to
65 percent of those in households that do not own a washing machine. The survey reports
time allocation with an average of 88 minutes per week spent on housework (buying food,
preparing food, or washing clothes). Children in households that do not own a washing
machine spend 45 minutes per week on housework more than children in households that
own a washing machine.
Household wealth is also presented in Table 2.1, with children living in households
that own a washing machine being of a higher wealth status. A discussion on household
income and creation of the wealth index is presented in the following section. 47 percent of
the older child sample live in households that own a washing machine. Given that they own
a washing machine, 50 percent also own a refrigerator. Only 7 percent of the sample that do
not own a washing machine own a refrigerator. Washing machines and refrigerators are two
of the largest time-saving appliance purchases a household may make. Smaller time-saving
appliances are included as a robustness check and are available upon request.
15An analysis on younger children (ages 6-11) is done as a robustness check. These results are available
upon request.
16On average, I observe each individual in 3.65 waves of data.
17Summary statistics for the sample not conditional on washing machine ownership are available in the
Online Appendix, Table A1. Online Appendix available at: sites.google.com/site/amandackerr/research.
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Table 2.2 compares individual characteristics in the first two years of data available,
1989 and 1991, to the last two years of data available, 2009 and 2011, conditional on wash-
ing machine ownership.18 Over this 23 year period, enrollment rates for older children have
increased from 62 percent to 89 percent and completed years of schooling have increased by
1.32 years. These increases are observed for both children in households that do and do not
own a washing machine. There has been a 30 minute decrease in average time dedicated
to weekly housework. However, when the sample is divided by washing machine ownership
status, it appears both groups experience a slight increase in average time dedicated to
housework.19 Visual representations of time trends in enrollment, washing machine owner-
ship, and housework for older children are presented in Figures 2.1-2.3. Time allocation data
(housework) from 1989-2000 are available for nearly all individuals surveyed ages six and
above. Time allocation data from 2004-2011 are missing in up to half of the surveyed sample
ages six and above each year, which changes the nature of the sample and potentially causes
a selection bias. However, this does not affect my estimation as I am able to control for this
change. Housework results presented are similar to results obtained when performing the
analysis exclusively on years up to 2000, where time allocation data are more representative
of the full sample. Additionally, I generate a variable indicating if time allocation data
are missing and regress this variable on all covariates used in the analysis. The covariates
that significantly predict missing data on time allocation include gender, wealth index, and
presence of a secondary school in the community. Being female decreases the probability
of missing data on housework by 3.7 percentage points, an increase in the wealth index
increases the probability of missing data on housework by 1.1 percentage points, and living
in a community that has a secondary school decreases the probability of missing data on
housework by 2.6 percentage points. This indicates that the sample may be biased towards
females living in lower wealth households, which would explain why average time dedicated
to housework increases from years with full information on housework to years lacking data
18A similar breakdown unconditional on washing machine ownership is presented in Columns 4-9 of Table
A1 in the Online Appendix.
19These results suggest a Simpson’s paradox, where a trend appears in different groups of data but
disappears or reverses when these groups are combined.
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on housework.
Households with children between the ages 12-18 have increased their ownership
of washing machines from 29 percent to 74 percent over the 23 year period. Refrigera-
tor ownership has increased from 9 percent to 62 percent. Given that a child lives in a
household that owns a washing machine, their refrigerator ownership increased by nearly
50 percentage points. Households that do not own a washing machine also experience an
increase in refrigerator ownership of 21 percentage points. Again, these durable appliances
are considered time-saving appliances. Visual representations of time trends in washing
machine and refrigerator ownership for both rural and urban households are presented in
Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
Summary statistics presented in this section highlight large increases in enrollment
rates for older children and time-saving appliance ownership. An economic analysis must
be conducted in order to determine how these changes influence one another.
2.5 Wealth Index
A wealth index is developed to address the concern of time-saving appliances pick-
ing up a “wealth effect” rather than the direct effect of the appliance on housework (en-
rollment/employment). Careful analysis was taken to accurately measure a household’s
wealth.
The CHNS provides data on household income for a subsample of households. This
variable is used as a validity check when creating the wealth index to verify that the value
of each household’s wealth index is consistent with household income for those households
that reported income. Household income is not used in the empirical analysis for multiple
reasons. Household income is endogenous as it is fully determined by allocation of time.
A household that allocates a significant amount of time to market work will have a higher
household income than households who allocate less time to market work.20 Additionally,
20Using father’s income rather than household income presents less of an endogeneity concern. I perform
the full analysis using father’s income as a control. Performing the analysis excluding father’s income does
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data on household income is limited to households with above average household income
when compared to average household income reported by community leaders. Figure 2.6
presents average household income reported at the household and the community level for
the 23 year period of data, along with the computed wealth index. Average household
income reported at the household level is 19,870 yuans and average household income re-
ported at the community level is 14,522 yuans. Including household income in my results
would bias my results by only including a wealthier subset of the sample.
The wealth index is calculated using information on a household’s ownership of non-
time-saving appliances and household infrastructure, placing households on a continuous
scale of relative wealth. Wealth indices are typically used in countries that lack reliable
data on income and expenditures. Using a factor analysis approach and following steps
similar to those developed by the Demographic and Health Surveys, I am able to assign
household assets and infrastructure a weight (factor score) and combined these weights by
household to rank each household’s overall wealth.21,22
Household assets that measure potential wealth but do not alter time dedicated to
housework (non-time-saving appliances) include: air conditioner, bedroom furniture, black
and white television, bicycle, camera, car, cellphone, clock, color television, computer, DVD
player, electric fan, living room furniture, motorcycle, satellite, sewing machine, stereo,
telephone, tricycle, VCR, and water pump.23 Ownership of each of these assets is indicated
using dummy variables, with a value equal to one if a household owns the asset and zero
otherwise.24
not alter the magnitude or significance of any results presented in this analysis. The father’s income variable
is constructed using (1) directly reported father’s income, (2) imputed father’s income (imputed by the
CHNS), and (3) average male income within a community if the first two measures are unavailable.
21See: http://www.dhsprogram.com/topics/wealth-index/.
22From Kennedy (2008): Factor analysis produces linear combinations of subsets of variables that share
maximum common variation in hopes to represent some unmeasured factor. Large numbers of possible
explanatory variables are reduced to a smaller number of factors, with the highly collinear variables consol-
idated.
23Modes of transportation (bicycle, motorcycle, and car) may alter time dedicated to housework. However,
these assets are of a different category than the time-saving appliances observed in this analysis and are
reliable measures of wealth so they are included in the wealth index.
24Slight adjustments of ownership for three variables are made: black and white television, tricycle, and
motorcycle. If a household owns a color television I assume they are wealthy enough to own a black and
white television and therefore set the dummy variable indicating ownership of a black and white television
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Infrastructure variables included in the wealth index are drinking water access, toilet
facility access, main lighting source, main cooking fuel, and main water source. These
variables are discrete variables. Drinking water access is indicated with a value between
one and four, with one being the lowest wealth indicating drinking water (source outside
of house or yard) and four being the highest wealth indicating drinking water (in-house
tap). Toilet facility access is indicated with a value between one and seven, with one being
the lowest wealth indicating toilet facility (earth open-pit) and seven being the highest
wealth indicating toilet facility (in-house flush). Main lighting source is indicated with a
value between one and two, with one being any lighting source other than electric lighting
and two being the highest wealth indicating lighting source (electric). Main cooking fuel is
indicated with a value between one and five, with one being the lowest wealth indicating
cooking fuel (wood) and five being the highest wealth indicating cooking fuel (natural gas).
Main water source is indicated with a value between one and five, with one being the lowest
wealth indicating water source (open well) and five being the highest wealth indicating
water source (water plant).
These infrastructure variables are used along with the ownership indicator variables
in a factor analysis approach to estimate factor scores for each household in each year of
data available. I sum the factor scores across households each year to create a wealth
index between the values 0 and 4.38, with 0 representing the least wealthy households and
4.38 representing the wealthiest households in the sample. I compare this wealth index
with available household income to verify that households which report higher incomes
also obtain higher wealth indices. One concern with the wealth index is that the average
wealth drops in the last year of data, 2011, suggesting that households in this year are
less wealthy than households in the previous year of data available, 2009. The list of
variables used to construct the wealth index in 2009 and 2011 are identical, meaning no
new wealth indicating variables were introduced to the survey in 2011. Without introducing
new measures of wealth, households in the previous wave of data who were categorized as
equal to one for households that own a color television. I do the same for bicycle ownership (reassigning
ownership of a tricycle to one) and car ownership (reassigning ownership of a motorcycle to one).
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“less wealthy” have had time to save and purchase the assets that only wealthier households
were able to purchase in the previous wave. This lowers the factor score for each variable,
which decreases the overall wealth index. Additionally, in the last wave of data, two percent
of the households report an average household income within the community over twice as
large as the maximum household income within the community reported in the previous
wave of data. These households cause the standard deviation of household income within
the community in the 2011 wave to be over four times larger than the standard deviation
in the 2009 wave. These two changes in the data cause the wealth index to be lower and
the average household income reported by the community leaders to be higher in the 2011
wave. Controlling for both of these variables guarantees that the results are taking into
account multiple channels of changes in household wealth. I perform the analysis excluding
the 2011 wave due to the drastic changes in household income within the community and
the wealth index as a robustness check. Results are similar in magnitude and significance
for all regressions.
The wealth index is available for 99.9 percent of the sample, while household income
reported by the household (community leader) is only available for 69.5 (80.6) percent of
the sample. Using the wealth index in my analysis allows me to perform my analysis on
a larger sample while controlling for wealth, which is an important determinant of both
appliance ownership and child outcomes. All results presented in this analysis include the
wealth index as a control.
2.6 Empirical Model
In this section I outline the empirical model used to estimate the effect on child
outcomes of living in a household that owns a time-saving appliance. I focus on three child
outcome variables: housework, enrollment, and employment. Housework is the average
number of minutes dedicated to household chores (specifically buying food, preparing food,
and washing clothes for the household) every week. Enrollment (employed) is a dummy
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variable equal to one if the individual is currently enrolled (employed) and zero otherwise.
An expression that estimates the relationship between appliance ownership and these de-
pendent variables is presented in Equation 2.6.
Yict = β0 + β1applianceict +Xictβ2 + εict (2.6)
where applianceict is a dummy indicating whether the individual lives in a household that
owns a washing machine (refrigerator) at the time of the survey and Xict is a vector of
individual, household, and community control variables that would affect child outcomes.
Individual controls include age, age squared, and gender. Household controls include place
of residence (rural/urban), Han status, wealth index, father’s income, and parental controls
(parents’ ages and educational attainments). Community controls include average house-
hold income, if there is a convenient telephone service available, if there are public baths
available, if the community is located near a train station, if the community is located near
an open trade area, if the community is located near a navigable river, and if there is a
secondary school located within the community.25 Year controls, province controls, and
province linear time trends are also included in all results.26 Standard errors are clustered
at the community level in all specifications.
A concern when estimating Equation 2.6 is the possibility that appliance ownership
is correlated with unobserved factors that determine time allocation. Coen-Pirani, León,
and Lugauer (2010) explain the potential biases that exist when using OLS to test the effect
of appliance ownership on female labor force participation. An adapted version of their
reasoning is relevant to my analysis: (1) households with many children in school are more
likely to purchase appliances due to a higher need for these appliances, creating an upward
bias or (2) households with a strong taste in home produced goods may invest heavily in
both housework and household appliances, creating a downward bias. Parental preferences
25All household and community controls are represented as dummy variables in the results below. Results
using distance rather than dummy variables for train station, public baths, and secondary school do not
alter the conclusions presented in this analysis.
26Additional regressions are performed (1) excluding province linear time trends and (2) using province
× year controls rather than province linear time trends. Results are unaltered in both scenarios.
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are unobserved and are large determinants of a child’s human capital investment. They
may choose to invest in both schooling and appliances if they have a strong preference for
child outcomes and believe that time-saving appliance ownership will relieve their children of
household duties. Alternatively, a negative selection bias may be present if parents purchase
multiple appliances for reasons other than to reduce a child’s housework. Reverse causality
is an additional concern when using OLS. With multiple years between each wave I am
unable to determine if the household first purchases a time-saving appliance and then due
to the decrease in the time it takes to perform housework they enroll their child in school
or if they initially enroll their child in school and due to the child no longer being at home
they decide to purchase a time-saving appliance. Controlling for variables such as parental
and community characteristics will mitigate these biases, but there is always a possibility
of other unobservables biasing my results. I perform 2SLS estimations in addition to OLS
estimations in order to address these potential sources of endogeneity.
I use an instrumental variable strategy to identify the causal effect of owning a
time-saving appliance on child outcomes. For my instrument to be valid it must affect the
potentially endogenous variable (living in a household that owns a time-saving appliance),
but have no direct effect on the dependent variable (housework, enrollment, or employment).
To determine the effect of household appliance ownership on married women’s female labor
force participation, Coen-Pirani, León, and Lugauer (2010) instrument a married woman’s
ownership of an appliance by the average ownership rate for that appliance among single
women living in the same U.S. state. Single women’s labor force participation rates did
not increase during the time period in question and therefore they argue that “observed
temporal and cross-section variation in single women’s ownership of home appliances is
driven by the (unobserved) appliance costs rather than by changes in women’s labor force
participation rates.”
In this analysis, I implement a similar instrument as Coen-Pirani, León, and Lugauer
(2010). I use appliance ownership decisions of households with no children as an instrument
for ownership decisions of households with children. Households without children do not face
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the same trade-off decisions between child outcomes and appliance ownership as households
with children. Therefore a change in ownership rates for childless households would be due
to changes within the community not related to child outcomes (such as a price decrease
due to a new store or the introduction of a lower cost model). Since they do not have
children, their purchasing decision is not based on a desire to alter a child’s time allocated
to housework. I calculate the average appliance ownership of households with no children
between the ages 0-18 in each community.27 Figure 2.7 (2.8) depicts the average washing
machine (refrigerator) ownership for households with no children and the average washing
machine (refrigerator) ownership for households with at least one child between the ages
0-18. Ownership for both groups appears to follow a similar trend.28
I now define household appliance ownership as a function of average appliance own-
ership among households with no children living in the same community.
applianceict = α0 + α1avgownershipict +Xictα2 + ξict (2.7)
Equation 2.7 is the first stage equation, where avgownershipict is the average appliance
ownership for households with no children living in the community which individual i resides
in year t and Xict is a vector of controls from Equation 2.6. The endogenous regressor
(applianceict) is household specific, while the instrument (avgownershipict) varies at the
community-year level. The causal impact of living in a household that owns a time-saving
appliance on child outcomes can be formalized as follows:
Yict = β0 + β1 ̂applianceict +Xictβ2 + εict (2.8)
Note that average ownership for households with no children is a continuous instrument, so
I am estimating the average marginal treatment effect of living in a household that owns a
time-saving appliance on child outcomes.
27Each year of the sample consists of between 188-219 communities.
28The overall average washing machine (refrigerator) ownership for childless households and households
with at least one child are 56 and 53 percent (48 and 35 percent), respectively.
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2.7 Results
The effects of appliance ownership on child outcomes are similar when analyzing
either a washing machine or a refrigerator as the time-saving appliance. To conserve space
I present results for washing machine ownership below and note any (small) differences.
Results using refrigerator as the time-saving appliance are available in the Online Appendix.
Additionally, this analysis is performed using ownership of at least one time-saving appliance
(washing machine or refrigerator) rather than distinguishing between which appliance is
owned. I obtain results of similar magnitude and significance using this method. These
results are also reported in the Online Appendix.
2.7.1 OLS Results
Using Equation 2.6, I present OLS results in Table 2.3 (Online Appendix Table A2)
of the effect of living in a household that owns a washing machine (refrigerator) on time
dedicated to housework, enrollment, and employment for the sample.
The overall analysis discussed so far hinges on the idea that time-saving appliances
alter an individual’s time allocation, providing them the opportunity to reallocate their time
to other activities, specifically schooling. The CHNS has detailed data on time allocated to
a handful of household chores, including: buying food, preparing food, and washing clothes
for the household.29 The constructed measure of housework sums the total time a child
dedicates to the three possible housework activities to estimate the average time dedicated
to housework every week.30
Living in a household that owns either time-saving appliance decreases average time
dedicated to housework each week by roughly 15 minutes (Column 1). When the sample
29Variables indicating time allocated to child care and cleaning house are also available. However, these
variables are not included in the constructed measure of housework. Child care can be viewed as either
a leisure activity or as part of housework, in which child care services have been developed with parents
willing to pay to reduce their time spent with their children (Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis, 2013).
The cleaning house variable was not introduced until the 1997 survey and is therefore not included in the
constructed housework variable. This analysis has been performed omitting waves prior to 1997 to include
data on time dedicated to cleaning house and has found similar results.
30These activities do not include all household chores and therefore the results presented can be thought
of only as a rough estimate of the effect of household appliance ownership on time allocation.
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is separated by gender, I find that living in a household that owns a washing machine
(refrigerator) significantly decreases the average time dedicated to housework for the female
(male) sample.
Columns 4-6 in Table 2.3 present the results using enrollment as the child outcome
variable. Living in a household that owns a washing machine (refrigerator) increases the
probability of being enrolled by 5.3 (6.5) percentage points. This result is significant for both
genders. The coefficient is larger for the gender that experiences the significant decrease
in housework in the previous results: female children experience a significant decrease in
time dedicated to housework and a larger increase in the probability of being enrolled than
male children when living in a household that owns a washing machine (5.9 percentage
point increase compared to 4.8 percentage point increase). Male children experience a
significant decrease in time dedicated to housework and a larger increase in the probability
of being enrolled than female children when living in a household that owns a refrigerator
(8.3 percentage point increase compared to 5.1 percentage point increase). This suggests
that the increase in enrollment is a result of the decrease in time dedicated to housework
and the effect varies by gender and appliance.
The final OLS results presented estimate current employment in the older child sam-
ple.31 The results find that living in a household that owns a washing machine (refrigerator)
significantly decreases the probability of being employed by 13.0 (8.3) percentage points.
Both gender samples experience significant decreases in the probability of being employed
when living in a household that owns either time-saving appliance. Female children experi-
ence a larger and more significant decrease in the probability of being employed when living
in a household that owns a washing machine (19.3 percentage point decrease). Male chil-
dren experience a larger and more significant decrease in the probability of being employed
when living in a household that owns a refrigerator (11.2 percentage point decrease).
The OLS results suggest that time-saving appliances have a significant effect on
older child outcomes, with the presence of a washing machine (refrigerator) affecting female
31Data on employment status are available for individuals ages 16 and older in surveys prior to the 2004
survey and for all individuals not currently enrolled in the more recent surveys.
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(male) children more than male (female) children. As mentioned in the previous section,
OLS results are biased due to the endogeneity of appliance ownership. The next subsection
presents 2SLS results.
2.7.2 2SLS Results
First stage results are obtained using Equation 2.7. These results are reported in
Table 2.4 and Online Appendix Table A3. I estimate how the average community own-
ership rate of a washing machine (refrigerator) among households with no children affects
household washing machine (refrigerator) ownership for households with children. In all
specifications, I find that the likelihood of owning a washing machine (refrigerator) in-
creases by 38 percentage points for households with children when the average ownership
for households with no children in the same community increases. The sample size changes
slightly depending on the outcome variable used in the second stage (housework, enrollment,
and employment), but the first stage results are similar across all three samples.
Panel A of Table 2.5 presents OLS and 2SLS results side-by-side. I find that living in
a household that owns a washing machine significantly decreases the average time dedicated
to housework by 77.9 minutes per week.32 This coefficient is over five times larger than
the coefficient estimated using OLS, indicating that OLS estimates are biased downward.
Dividing the sample by gender, I find that the decrease in time dedicated to housework is
driven by the female sample, where female children experience a 187 minute decrease in
average time dedicated to housework each week. The results indicate that children living in
a household that owns a washing machine experience a significant decrease in time allocated
to housework.
It is useful to view these point estimates in the context of the larger population.
Children living in households that do not own a washing machine spend approximately
107 minutes per week on housework (Table 2.1). Thus, using for example the estimate
in column 2 (β̂ = −77.917), or a decrease in average time dedicated to housework by 78
32Using 2SLS and a refrigerator as the time-saving appliance, the 38 minute decrease in average time
dedicated to housework is found to be insignificant (Panel A of Online Appendix Table A4).
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minutes per week, living in a household that owns a washing machine eliminates 73 percent
of time dedicated to housework. The presence of a time-saving durable good appears to
effectively reduce time dedicated to housework.
I have established that living in a household that owns a washing machine signifi-
cantly reduces the time dedicated to housework. I now investigate what children are doing
with the time that was initially dedicated to housework. As the head(s) of the household
decides how children within the household allocate their time, I hypothesize that children
will reallocate their time to an activity that will be beneficial for both the child and the
head(s). Specifically, I anticipate children staying in school longer, rather than dropping
out to assist with housework. I test this by looking at current enrollment rates for older
children.
Panel B of Table 2.5 presents the effect of living in a household that owns a washing
machine on enrollment for children between the ages 12-18. I estimate a 12 percentage
point increase in the probability of being enrolled when living in a household that owns a
washing machine. Dividing the sample by gender, I find a 17.8 percentage point increase
in the probability of being enrolled for female children and an insignificant increase for
male children when living in a household that owns a washing machine. These results are
consistent with the results found when analyzing the effect of living in a household that owns
a washing machine on housework: female children decrease their average time dedicated to
housework and increase their probability of being enrolled when living in a household that
owns a washing machine.33 For the population of children aged 12-18 living in households
without washing machines, the proportion enrolled is estimated to be 65 percent (Table
2.1). Among females, the rate is 63 percent (not shown in Table 2.1). The estimated effect
of living in a household that owns a washing machine for females (β̂ = 0.178; Panel B of
Table 2.5, Column 6) suggests that the presence of a washing machine induces an increase
in female enrollment rates of 28 percent.
33Both genders experience significant increases in the probability of being enrolled when living in a
household that owns a refrigerator (Panel B of Online Appendix Table A4). The female sample coefficient
is of a larger magnitude than the male sample.
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The final analysis performed estimates the effect of living in a household that owns a
time-saving appliance on the probability of being employed. Child labor is typically viewed
as a last resort for low-income families, where children enter the labor force only when the
household income drops below a certain threshold (Basu and Van, 1998). Panel C of Table
2.5 finds that living in a household that owns a washing machine decreases the probability
of being employed by 47.7 percentage points for older children.34 The effects are similar
in magnitude for both gender samples with male and female children experiencing a 48.8
and 53.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of being employed, respectively. It
is again useful to place the employment effects in the context of the child labor market in
China. The overall employment rate among children aged 12-18 living in households that
do not own washing machines is approximately 72 percent (Table 2.1). From that frame
of reference, the estimated effect of living in a household that owns a washing machine
(β̂ = −0.477; Panel C of Table 2.5, Column 2) suggests that washing machine ownership
generates a 66 percent decrease in child labor force participation rates.
The results found above observing employment status require some explanation, as
the theoretical model presented suggests that when children decrease their time in household
activities they will increase their time in schooling, leisure, and/or market work. However,
recall that the model represents the composite utility function of the household, not just
the child’s utility function. Adult labor and child labor are typically viewed as substitutes
(Basu and Van, 1998). If, as previous literature has found, living in a household that owns
a time-saving appliance increases adult female labor force participation, this would explain
the large decrease in the probability of being employed for both genders. An increase in
female labor force participation is accompanied by an increase in household income and as
household income increases, children are removed from the labor force. In these data, time
dedicated to market work is unavailable and therefore I am unable to estimate the extent
to which mother’s labor force participation has increased.35 However, when I include a
34Older children living in a household that owns a refrigerator experience a 29.9 percentage point decrease
in the probability of being employed (Panel C of Online Appendix Table A4).
35Performing the same analysis and observing the outcome variable mother employed, I find no effect
on the probability of being employed for mothers of children in the sample. However, I cannot determine
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control variable indicating if the mother is currently employed, I find that the magnitude
of the effect on the probability of being employed for children in my sample decreases by
three percentage points. Therefore, the results presented above are potentially picking up
not only the effect of a decrease in time dedicated to housework for older children in the
sample, but also an increase in time dedicated to market work for adult females in the
sample.
Observing two time-saving appliances and three child outcomes, I find that living in a
household that owns a time-saving appliance decreases average time dedicated to housework,
increases the probability of being enrolled, and decreases the probability of being employed
for children in the sample. The first two findings are driven by the female sample, while
the probability of being employed decreases for both genders significantly.
2.8 Conclusion and Discussion
I find that living in a household that owns a washing machine: (1) decreases the
average time dedicated to housework by 77.9 minutes per week, (2) increases the proba-
bility of being enrolled by 12 percentage points, and (3) decreases the probability of being
employed by 47.7 percentage points. Living in a household that owns certain time-saving
appliances increases a child’s educational outcome by providing a lower opportunity cost of
staying in school and increasing the probability of being enrolled. One potential explanation
for these results is that the presence of time-saving appliances directly affects the time a
child is required to be at home performing housework. This explanation is supported by
results found when observing children living in households that own a washing machine.
Another potential effect of time-saving appliances is an indirect effect on a child’s education
and employment due to time-saving appliances altering a mother’s (or female child’s) time
allocation and bargaining power through an increase in her productivity within, and poten-
tially outside, the household. With an increase in bargaining power, women may use this
if a mother allocates more time to working in the labor force once the household purchases a time-saving
appliance.
52
power to improve their children’s outcomes (as well as own outcomes), specifically through
higher education. The significant increases in the probability of being enrolled along with
the insignificant decreases in housework when living in a household that owns a refrigerator
suggest that there is more than just the direct effect of a reallocation of time occurring.
Finding larger magnitudes and stronger significance in the female sample results throughout
this analysis also supports the presence of an indirect effect. Changes in female bargaining
power are likely additional forces causing the increase in the probability of being enrolled
and decrease in the probability of being employed when time-saving appliances are present.
With a decrease in the time required to perform housework and a possible increase in
female bargaining power as a result of appliance ownership, there may occur (1) a reduction
in the need for child household labor and children reallocating their time to schooling, or (2)
no reduction in the need for child household labor, but instead increases in child outcomes
due to a spillover effect. In this case, the mother’s increased bargaining power within the
household leads to better child outcomes due to females attaching higher values to children’s
welfare (Mencher, 1988; Thomas, 1990; Behrman, 1992; Agarwal, 1994; Strauss et al., 2000;
Duflo, 2012). Again, the first outcome is supported by washing machine results and the
second outcome is supported by refrigerator results.
There has yet to be a consensus on whether time-saving appliances decrease time
dedicated to housework due to housework requiring less time or increase/unalter time ded-
icated to housework because the increase in productivity results in individuals performing
more of these household tasks. The results found in this paper suggest that there is a
change in the composition of who performs the household chores, but further investigation
into all household members’ time allocation must be performed to determine if overall time
dedicated to housework changes.
Between December 2007 and January 2013, the “Home Appliances to the Country-
side” subsidy program was available in rural China, providing households 13 percent rebates
on certain household appliances. This program was intended to stimulate rural consump-
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tion and boost the country’s economic growth,36 extending rebates to the appliances in my
analysis. With such impressive decreases in average time dedicated to housework, increases
in the probability of being enrolled, and decreases in the probability of being employed
for children in this sample, a continuation and extension to the “Home Appliances to the
Countryside” subsidy program may have additional effects on, not only consumer spending,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: OLS - Effect of Living in a Household that Owns a Washing Machine on Yict
Housework Enrollment Employment
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
own washing machine -14.749** -3.848 -28.995*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.059*** -0.130*** -0.076*** -0.193***
(6.087) (4.784) (10.675) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.034)
individual controls:
age 18.106 33.856** 1.397 0.312*** 0.354*** 0.269*** -0.319*** -0.383** -0.254
(25.017) (15.840) (47.120) (0.038) (0.055) (0.052) (0.109) (0.163) (0.166)
age squared -0.303 -1.015* 0.458 -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.010*
(0.864) (0.537) (1.623) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
female 77.195*** -0.015 0.017
(8.565) (0.011) (0.019)
household controls:
rural -11.721 -8.770 -18.709 -0.069*** -0.079*** -0.055*** 0.143*** 0.164*** 0.105***
(12.267) (6.399) (21.388) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037)
han 14.814 3.347 30.524 -0.007 -0.009 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.024
(16.300) (10.994) (31.182) (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.041) (0.056) (0.045)
wealth index -21.012*** -8.291*** -33.788*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.054*** -0.071*** -0.084*** -0.055***
(4.775) (2.937) (8.644) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
father’s income -0.158 -0.119 -0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.166) (0.178) (0.262) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
father’s age -1.399 -0.796 -1.564 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006** -0.006 -0.006
(1.066) (0.808) (1.867) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
father completed primary -21.231** 5.065 -46.864** 0.073*** 0.044* 0.105*** -0.080** -0.083** -0.069*
(10.138) (8.137) (19.351) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.042) (0.041)
mother’s age 0.192 0.028 -0.082 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.006* 0.006 0.007
(1.074) (0.926) (1.922) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
mother completed primary -9.587 -9.141* -11.577 0.045*** 0.040** 0.051** -0.129*** -0.153*** -0.104***
(7.256) (5.284) (14.304) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.037) (0.035)
community controls:
average household income -0.063 0.082 -0.175 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.280) (0.423) (0.374) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
telephone 15.671 15.073** 20.171 0.029* 0.008 0.050** -0.045 -0.046 -0.037
(12.066) (7.499) (20.487) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.033) (0.045) (0.041)
public baths -6.796 -11.013* -6.384 0.033** 0.046** 0.015 -0.041 -0.057 -0.027
(6.421) (5.810) (11.172) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.041) (0.038)
train station -7.542 -6.869 -9.364 0.018 -0.001 0.042** -0.003 0.003 -0.006
(8.346) (6.117) (14.503) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.031) (0.037) (0.039)
near open trade area -5.149 5.590 -16.787 -0.005 -0.011 0.001 -0.013 0.005 -0.035
(7.060) (6.169) (12.678) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) (0.031) (0.036)
near navigable river 23.101* 8.452 32.206 -0.012 -0.020 0.004 0.007 0.012 -0.004
(13.792) (7.810) (24.424) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.035) (0.042)
secondary school 14.841 0.736 35.146** 0.025 0.034 0.013 -0.068** -0.051 -0.084*
(9.233) (9.219) (15.284) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.046) (0.043)
average washing machine ownership 0.444 0.439 0.448 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.408 0.408 0.409
average Yict 75.185 37.803 113.941 0.750 0.757 0.742 0.450 0.437 0.465
N 6656 3388 3268 7278 3794 3484 2737 1425 1312
R2 0.098 0.094 0.103 0.301 0.305 0.312 0.243 0.247 0.260
Notes: All columns include province and year fixed effects, province linear time trends and exclude observations from the year
1989 due to lack of data on community variables: average household income and secondary school. Standard errors are presented
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
Standard errors are clustered at the community level.
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Table 2.4: First Stage - Effect of Average Washing Machine Ownership Among Households
with No Children on the Probability of a Child Living in a Household that Owns a Washing
Machine
Housework Enrollment Employment
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
avg community washing machine ownership (no kids) 0.375*** 0.403*** 0.341*** 0.377*** 0.405*** 0.342*** 0.376*** 0.403*** 0.337***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.051) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.055) (0.063) (0.072)
individual controls:
age -0.015 -0.021 -0.013 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.089 -0.159 -0.018
(0.039) (0.050) (0.058) (0.037) (0.046) (0.056) (0.112) (0.150) (0.160)
age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
female 0.010 0.006 0.028*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
household controls:
rural -0.056* -0.043 -0.072** -0.049* -0.038 -0.067** -0.073** -0.026 -0.145***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.036) (0.044)
han 0.096*** 0.118*** 0.082* 0.082** 0.105*** 0.066 0.102*** 0.125*** 0.077
(0.037) (0.038) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.047)
wealth index 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.121***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018)
father’s income 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
father’s age -0.004 -0.005* -0.002 -0.004* -0.005* -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
father completed primary 0.055** 0.046 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.045 0.067*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.082***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.031)
mother’s age 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
mother completed primary 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.096*** 0.129***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031)
community controls:
average household income 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001** 0.002 0.001 0.006*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
telephone 0.028 0.016 0.044 0.037 0.028 0.049* 0.023 0.010 0.040
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.034)
public baths 0.057** 0.044 0.064** 0.040 0.032 0.045 0.080** 0.095** 0.041
(0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044)
train station 0.025 0.008 0.040 0.026 0.015 0.037 0.042 -0.020 0.104**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.041) (0.042) (0.051)
near open trade area -0.022 -0.015 -0.029 -0.017 -0.019 -0.014 -0.034 0.000 -0.072**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.031)
near navigable river 0.054* 0.066** 0.040 0.042 0.053* 0.030 0.061* 0.048 0.066
(0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.038) (0.041)
secondary school 0.049* 0.036 0.061 0.038 0.027 0.046 0.070** 0.069* 0.080
(0.029) (0.026) (0.041) (0.027) (0.025) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.055)
average washing machine ownership 0.444 0.439 0.448 0.473 0.473 0.473 0.408 0.408 0.409
N 6656 3388 3268 7278 3794 3484 2737 1425 1312
R2 0.416 0.434 0.406 0.422 0.436 0.415 0.405 0.416 0.420
F -Statistic 82.201 92.189 43.726 90.146 104.193 46.690 45.957 41.090 22.152
Notes: All columns include province and year fixed effects, province linear time trends and exclude observations from the year
1989 due to lack of data on community variables: average household income and secondary school. Standard errors are presented
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
Standard errors are clustered at the community level.
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Table 2.5: 2SLS - Effect of Living in a Household that Owns a Washing Machine on Yict
All Male Female
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Housework
own washing machine -14.749** -77.917** -3.848 -5.426 -28.995*** -186.954***
(6.087) (31.459) (4.784) (29.479) (10.675) (66.690)
N. Obs. 6656 3388 3268
average washing machine ownership 0.444 0.439 0.448
average housework 75.185 37.803 113.941
Panel B: Enrollment
own washing machine 0.053*** 0.120** 0.048*** 0.098 0.059*** 0.178**
(0.013) (0.055) (0.015) (0.066) (0.018) (0.088)
N. Obs. 7278 3794 3484
average washing machine ownership 0.473 0.473 0.473
average enrollment 0.750 0.757 0.742
Panel C: Employment
own washing machine -0.130*** -0.477*** -0.076*** -0.488*** -0.193*** -0.531***
(0.023) (0.131) (0.029) (0.151) (0.034) (0.182)
N. Obs. 2737 1425 1312
average washing machine ownership 0.408 0.408 0.409
average employment 0.450 0.437 0.465
Notes: All columns include individual controls, household controls, community controls, province and year fixed effects, province
linear time trends and exclude observations from the year 1989 due to lack of data on community variables: average household
income and secondary school. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes
significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the community level.
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Figure 2.1: Enrollment Trend
Figure 2.2: Washing Machine Ownership Trend
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Figure 2.3: Housework Trend
Figure 2.4: Washing Machine Ownership: Rural v. Urban
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Figure 2.5: Refrigerator Ownership: Rural v. Urban
Figure 2.6: Income and Wealth Measures
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Figure 2.7: Washing Machine Ownership in Households With and Without Children




Income Shocks: Evidence from
Senior Chinese Households
3.1 Introduction
Availability of formal insurance is sparse in many developing countries. Prior to the de-
velopment of the Household Responsibility System in 2003, health insurance in rural China was
virtually nonexistent and urban health insurance was directly tied to formal employment, covering
only the employed individual (Strauss, et al., 2012). Less than 50 percent of city dwellers were cov-
ered by health insurance in 2005 (World Bank, 2009). The Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance
Scheme was introduced in 2007 to 79 cities and expanded to 229 cities in 2008, providing insurance
to non-employed, urban individuals. The New Cooperative Medical Scheme was established in 2003
in rural China and expanded nationally over time. Prior to these reforms, health insurance coverage
in rural China was roughly 20 percent, but by the end of 2007 coverage reached 86 percent of rural
counties (World Bank, 2009; Strauss, et al., 2012). Research thus far has found that these programs
lack coverage of outpatient expenditures, have low and unreliable reimbursement procedures, and
differ significantly across coverage and percentage of coverage (Strauss, et al., 2012). Strauss and
coauthors uses the regional variations in the implementation and timing of these programs to study
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the impact of policies and programs. Using the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS) they find that the majority of elderly individuals have some health insurance, most being
covered by the New Cooperative Medical Scheme. Reimbursement rates for inpatient services are
found to be between 30-40 percent. However, outpatient reimbursement rates for rural individuals
is only 8.5 percent, while urban individuals receive a 30 percent reimbursement rate. The results
found in this analysis suggest that formal insurance is improving in China, but there are still many
expenses that households are responsible for covering without the assistance of the government.
Households in developing countries have been tasked with determining alternative methods
to mitigate income risk. Without reliable access to formal insurance, households must find alter-
native methods to protect themselves against an income shock in order to smooth consumption.
Rosenzweig (1988) explores the role of the household as a risk-mitigating institution in low-income
rural settings and finds that the degree to which households succeed in mitigating risk ex post via
transfers is significantly influenced by household structure as it facilitates extra-village ties with
household relatives serving as alternative shelters in times of severe village-level income or weather
shocks. When a household diversifies its family income sources and partakes in intrafamily (and
interhousehold) income sharing, they are capable of acting as their own insurers and smoothing
household consumption. Rosenzweig & Stark (1989) use a risk model and find that marital arrange-
ments are used as implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed to mitigate income risks
and facilitate consumption smoothing in rural India. They find that nonresident in-laws in India are
the principle source of income transfers for households which experience income shortfalls associated
with weather shocks. Fafchamps & Lund (2003) investigate whether asset sales, gifts, and informal
loans allow households to share risk within confined networks of family and friends. They find that
loans and gifts vary with shocks, with an increase in gifts and informal loans when a household faces
a severe shock in rural Philippines.
This paper examines the impact of family size on income risk and consumption smooth-
ing. Using data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) and cross-
sectional variation in family size and health status, we find that children assist their senior parents
when their parents experience a health shock. We face two endogeneity concerns in this analysis
and address both with an instrumental variable strategy. Our first concern is the endogeneity of
family size due to unobserved preferences in number of children. We first use the occurrence of
multiple births (twins) as an exogenous variation in family size.1 We also use community variation
1The use of twins as an exogenous variation in family size was developed by Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1980).
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in the level of strictness of the One Child Policy in China to determine the number of children a
family is legally allowed to have. Our second concern is the endogeneity of income transfers from
children due to unobserved preferences in children’s generosity. Although children may vary in the
initial value of income transfers provided to parents, we anticipate that the value of their income
transfers will increase when a parent experiences a health shock. As health care is a large portion
of household expenses for senior households,2 a health shock can be seen as a shock to a senior
individual’s income, where the individual now has less resources for food and other expenses. We
hypothesis that transfers received from children will respond to these health shocks and with this
change in transfers senior individuals will experience less of an effect on consumption of other goods
and services following a health shock. These senior individuals will use the extra transfers from
their children to pay for health care so they are capable of keeping their consumption of other goods
reasonably the same.
We empirically test our model and find that children decrease the probability of senior indi-
viduals reporting bad health in the current period when senior individuals experience a health shock
in the previous period. Individuals without children who experience a health shock in the previous
period increase their probability of reporting bad health in the current period by 22 percentage
points. Senior individuals who have one child and experience a health shock in the previous period
increase their probability of reporting bad health in the current period by 20.4 percentage points.
Each additional child decreases the probability of reporting bad health in the current period by 1.6
percentage points when senior individuals experience a health shock in the previous period.
Children are additionally found to mitigate the effect of a health shock on average labor
income and average total income. Senior individuals with no children face a 89 percent decrease in
average log labor income when they experience a health shock in the previous period. The presence
of each additional child reduces the decrease in average log labor income by 12 percentage points
when senior individuals experience a health shock in the previous period, with one child reducing
the decrease in average log labor income to 77 percent and two children reducing the decrease in
average log labor income to 65 percent. The effect on log total income is of a smaller magnitude but
a similar conclusion is reached, where senior individuals with no children experiencing a 57 percent
decrease in average log total income when they experience a health shock in the previous period
and each additional child mitigates the magnitude of the decrease in income by 15 percentage points
2Labor income is only 70 percent of average total income in our sample. The sample analyzed in this
paper is senior individuals 45 years and older.
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(e.g., senior individuals with one child face a 42 percent decrease in average log total income when
they experience a health shock in the previous period and senior individuals with two children face a
24 percent decrease in average log total income when they experience a health shock in the previous
period). These results are driven by male children.
Given the lack of formal insurance in developing countries, understanding the different
tactics used to smooth consumption is important for improving the overall well-being of households
in these areas. Our results suggest that, when formal insurance is unavailable, parents may choose
to use their children as a consumption smoothing tool. The following sections describe the data
available in the CHARLS, outline an empirical strategy to study the relationship between family
size and income risk, and then use the CHARLS data to estimate how children affect parents’
outcomes.
3.2 The CHARLS Data
The data are from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS).3 Sam-
pling Chinese residents ages 45 and older, the baseline wave (2011) includes 10,000 households and
17,500 individuals in 150 counties/districts. Households and individuals are re-interviewed every
two years, with the 2013 and 2014 waves currently available. Data are available on demographics,
family structure, family transfer, health status and functioning, biomarkers, health care and insur-
ance, work, retirement and pension, income and consumption, household and individual assets, and
community level information.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1. The average age in our sample is 58 years
old with just over half of the sample being female. 54 percent of the sample is uneducated (having
no formal education or did not complete primary school), 36 percent received some schooling, and
11 percent received at least a high school degree. 60 percent of the sample lives in a rural area.
We examine three outcome variables in our analysis. The first indicates whether an indi-
vidual is currently in a state of bad health. The CHARLS provides self-reported health status in
each wave of data, with individuals reporting their current state of health on a scale between one
and five, where one represents excellent health and five represents poor health. An individual is
therefore assigned a status of bad health if they report their current health being fair or poor (a
3These surveys are conducted by the National School of Development at Peking University, with support
from the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the Behavioral and Social Research Division of the
National Institute on Aging, and the World Bank.
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value of four or five) in the second wave (2013). 76 percent of the sample reports bad health. This
is not surprising as our sample consists of senior household members.
The second outcome variable is labor income which includes annual wage earnings, fringe
benefits, other self employed activity income, and agricultural income from crop and livestock.
Average annual labor income is 9,711 yuans. The final outcome variable represents total annual
income which includes labor income as well as pension, government transfers, capital income, and
other income sources (alimony or child support). Average annual income is 13,696 yuans.
We are interested in determining how children’s financial support alters senior individuals’
outcomes. On average, a senior individual has 2.7 children, with an average of 1.4 sons and 1.3
daughters. These children receive 9.6 years of schooling, on average (primary school consists of 6
years of schooling and junior secondary/middle school consists of 3 years).
To assist with estimating a cause for changes in children’s support we estimate a health
shock in the first wave (2011), which would result in bad health in the second wave and the need
for children to assist parents in order for parents to continue to successfully smooth consumption.
An individual experiences a health shock if they were diagnosed with a chronic disease in the first
wave.4,5 Our sample consists of 56 percent of individuals experiencing a health shock.
Summary statistics presented in this section highlight individual level characteristics that
may influence the level of support received from children of senior individuals. An economic analysis
must be conducted in order to determine how children and health shocks influence outcomes of
senior individuals.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section we outline the empirical model used to analyze the effects of children on senior
individuals’ reported health and income. Reported health is converted to an indicator variable of
bad health equaling one if an individual reports fair or poor health and zero otherwise. Two income
variables are used in this analysis: labor income and total income. Both variables are expressed as
logarithms. An expression that estimates the relationship between family size (measured by number
4Both measures of health (bad health and health shock) are calculated in a similar manner as those
developed by Currie & Stabile (2003).
5These diseases include: high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, psy-
chiatric problems, arthritis, liver disease, kidney disease, stomach or other digestive disease, asthma, or
memory-related disease.
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of children) and senior outcomes is presented in Equation 3.1.
Yi = β0 + β1healthshocki + β2N.childreni + β3N.children× healthshocki +Xiβ4 + εi (3.1)
where Yi is bad health in current period, log labor income, or log total income, healthshocki indicates
if individual i experienced a health shock in the previous period, N.childreni indicates the number
of children individual i has, N.children×healthshock is the interaction between number of children
and health shock, and Xi is a vector of individual, household, and community control variables that
would affect reported health and income. These controls include age, gender, if the individual has
no education, place of residence (rural/urban), and the individual’s height and weight. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level in all specifications.
A potential problem arises when estimating Equation 3.1 in which there is a possibility
of N.childreni being correlated with εi, meaning there are unobserved factors that make some
individuals choose to have more children. Fertility decisions are unobserved in these data. To
address this concern, we use two different instruments to estimate family size. First, we instrument
number of children by the occurrence of multiple births (twins). Parents are unable to predict
the occurrence of multiple births and therefore this occurrence cannot be determined by behavior.
This identification strategy was first used by Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1980) and recently used by
Oliveira (2016). These authors use the occurrence of multiple first births. However, Rosenzweig &
Wolpin (1980) argue that although the probability of multiple births increases with the number of
births, comparing outcomes of individuals who birth twins at any parity with the outcomes of those
individuals who had singletons in all pregnancies might also capture differences in outcomes due to
differences in preferences for number of children. Therefore we use the occurrence of any multiple
birth regardless of birth order. Two percent of the sample have a multiple birth occurrence. Number
of children is then estimated as a function of number of multiple births (twins).
The second instrument is strictness of the One Child Policy (OCP). The OCP was a policy
implemented by the Chinese government as a method of controlling the population. Each family
was restricted to one child but there were some exceptions to the law depending on community and
family characteristics. The CHARLS provides detailed information on the strictness of the policy
at the community level, indicating: (1) when the policy was executed in the community, (2) at it’s
initial execution, the strictness of the policy (indicating if ethnic Han individuals in the community
may only birth one child, may have a second child if the first is a girl, may have two children, or may
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have more than two children), (3) if (and when) there were any changes in the family planning policy,
and (4) the new level of strictness once the policy changed. When the policy was first executed, 38
percent of communities allowed couples to have only one child, 30 percent allowed a second child
if the first was a girl, 28 percent allowed two children to all ethnic Han couples, and 4 percent
allowed all couples to have more than two children. In the sample, 40 percent of the communities
altered their family planning policy, with the percentage of communities allowing couples to have a
second child if the first child was a girl increasing to 55.5 percent. We develop a variable indicating
the strictness of the OCP at the time of first birth for each woman in each community, with one
indicating the least strict communities and four indicating the most strict communities. The average
strictness of the OCP at the time of first birth for women in the CHARLS is 3.1. Using this method,
number of children is then estimated as a function of the strictness of the OCP.
N.childreni = α0 + α1instrumenti +Xiα2 + ξit (3.2)
Equation 3.2 is the first stage estimation, where instrumenti indicates: (1) if individual i has ever
had a multiple birth occurrence (twins) or (2) the strictness of the OCP in the community individual i
lived in at the time of her first birth and Xit is a vector of controls from Equation 3.1. We now include
first stage estimates of number of children (N.childreni) and first stage estimates of the interaction
between number of children and health shock in previous period (N.children × healthshocki) to
estimate the causal impact of children on senior individuals’ outcomes:
Yi = β0 + β1healthshocki + β2 ̂N.childreni + β3 ̂N.children× healthshocki +Xiβ4 + εi (3.3)
The coefficient of interest is β3 which estimates the effect of children on senior individuals’ proba-
bility of reporting bad health in the current period and average log labor/total income when senior
individuals experiences a health shock in the previous period.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Health Shocks and Family Size
The effects of family size on senior individuals’ outcomes are presented in Table 3.2. Columns
1-4 report the effect of number of children on the probability of reporting bad health for senior
individuals. Estimating Equation 3.1 in Columns 1 and 2, we see that when a senior individual
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with no children experiences a health shock in the previous period, the probability of reporting bad
health in the current period increases by 22-23 percentage points. Each additional child decreases
the probability of reporting bad health during the current period by 1.6 percentage points (Column
1) when a senior individual experiences a health shock in the previous period. Column 2 breaks
down the effect by child gender and we see that male children drive this decrease in probability of
reporting bad health in the current period, with each son decreasing the effect of a health shock in
the previous period by 3.1 percentage points. Using the twin instrument and the OCP instrument
described in the empirical section and Equation 3.3, we see that senior individuals with no children
face an insignificant increase in the probability of reporting bad health in the current period when
experiencing a health shock in the previous period (Columns 3 and 4). Senior individuals with one
child who experience a health shock in the previous period face a significant increase in the probability
of reporting bad health in the current period by 22.4 (21.6) percentage points (HealthShock +
N.Children × HealthShock). Each additional child decreases the magnitude of the probability of
reporting bad health in the current period by 2.6 (2.4) percentage points when a senior individual
experiences a health shock in the previous period when using multiple births (the OCP) as an
instrument for family size. The similar results for both family size instruments suggest that our
instruments are estimating family size in a similar manner. The OLS and IV results indicate that
parents are using children as a way to mitigate shocks to their health.
Columns 5-8 in Table 3.2 present the results using log labor income as the outcome variable.
Senior individuals with no children who experience a health shock in the previous period report a
decrease in average log labor income by between 89-92 percent (Columns 4 and 5). The presence
of each additional child mitigates the decrease in average log labor income by 12 percentage points,
where senior individuals with one child experience a 77 percent decrease in average log labor income
and senior individuals with two children experience a 65 percent decrease in average log labor income
when they experience a health shock in the previous period. Again, it is male children who drive
the decrease in magnitude of average log labor income lost when a senior individual experiences a
health shock in the previous period, with each additional son increasing average log labor income
by 20 percentage points when a senior individual experiences a health shock in the previous period.
Columns 7 and 8 present the IV results, showing that senior individuals with no children experience
a 324 percent (132 percent) decrease in average log labor income when they experience a health
shock in the previous period, but each additional child decreases the magnitude of this effect by
97 percentage points (27 percentage points). We would anticipate that senior individuals who
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experience health shocks would be unable to work. Our results support this belief and show that
children assist with mitigating the effect of health shocks on average log labor income.
Our final outcome variable is log total income. These results are presented in Columns
9-12 of Table 3.2. These results suggest a similar story to the results found using log labor income,
but these results are of a smaller magnitude. This would be expected as senior individuals rely
less on labor income than younger individuals. OLS results suggest that senior individuals without
children face a decrease in average log total income between 57-62 percent when they experience a
health shock in the previous period. The presence of each additional child decreases this effect by 15
percentage points (Column 9) and, again, sons drive this effect (Column 10). IV results presented
in Columns 11 and 12 find insignificant, but similar effects. We would expect less of an effect on
total income if children are used as mitigating tools. This is present in the results, with smaller
coefficients on the health shock for senior individuals with no children but larger coefficients on the
interaction between children and health shock.
3.4.2 Health Shocks and Family Size: By Gender
In Table 3.3, we perform the same analysis as above but separate senior individuals by
gender.6 Observing our first outcome of interest, bad health in the current period, Columns 1-2
present the female senior sample and Columns 3-4 present the male senior sample. A health shock
in the previous period increases the probability of reporting bad health in the current period by a
similar magnitude for both genders. Each additional child present mitigates this effect by 1.5-1.7
percentage points and sons drive this effect. The results for this outcome variable are similar for
each gender.
Moving to the outcome variable log labor income, we find that health shocks and presence
of children significantly affect female senior individuals (Columns 5-6). The results for male senior
individuals are insignificant (Columns 7-8). This indicates that children only mitigate the effect of a
health shock on mother’s log labor income. An interesting finding that diverges from results found
without dividing the sample by gender is the effect of female children on average log labor income
when a senior female/male experiences a health shock in the previous period. For female seniors,
daughters are found to significantly mitigate the loss of average log labor income when a mother
experiences a health shock in the previous period with a magnitude close to the magnitude found
6We only present OLS results as the sample is not large enough to run IV results using twin births on
subsamples of the data. Future results will use the OCP instrument to control for family size.
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for sons. This suggests that daughters step in and perform the mother’s labor duties when she is
unable to perform them on her own. However, when a male senior experiences a health shock in
the previous period, female children significantly decrease the average log labor income (resulting
in a larger decrease in average log labor income when female children are present). This suggests
that when a father is unable to work, the daughter does not step in to perform his labor duties.
The presence of a daughter lowers average log labor income. In a developing country, a possible
explanation for this result is when a father experiences a health shock, the daughter is the household
member that stays home to help the father, which reduces both the father’s and the daughter’s labor
productivity.
The results obtained using log total income rather than log labor income are presented in
Columns 9-12. The conclusion reached is similar to those presented above for log labor income.
Again, we expect and find less of an effect on average log total income than average log labor income
when a senior individual experiences a health shock in the previous period and the presence of each
additional child having a larger mitigating effect when a parent experiences a health shock.
3.4.3 Health Shocks and Family Size: By Education
We next divide our sample by education levels, with the hypothesis that senior individuals
with less education require the assistance of their children more than senior individuals with a high
level of education. Tables 3.4-3.6 present the effect of family size on senior individuals’ reported bad
health, log labor income, and log total income for senior individuals who are uneducated (no formal
schooling or did not complete primary school), received some schooling, and received at least a high
school degree. Senior individuals with no children who experience a health shock in the previous
period face similar increases in the probability of reporting bad health in the current period, with the
magnitude of the coefficient being the largest for uneducated senior individuals (Columns 1-2 of Table
3.4). Uneducated senior individuals receive assistance from their children when they experience a
health shock in the previous period, with each child decreasing the magnitude of the health shock
by 2.1 percentage points. This decrease in magnitude is smaller for senior individuals with some
schooling (Columns 3-4) and senior individuals with at least a high school degree experience an
increase in the probability of reporting bad health in the current period by 2.4 percentage points
per child (Columns 5-6).
Results for the outcome variable log labor income are presented in Table 3.5. Uneducated
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senior individuals without children experience a larger and more significant decrease in average log
labor income when they experience a health shock in the previous period (Columns 1-2). Senior
individuals with at least a high school degree and no children experience insignificant decreases in
average log labor income when they experience a health shock in the previous period (Columns 5-6).
More educated individuals are expected to have better resources available to assist with income
shocks, which is reflected in the results. For uneducated individuals, each additional child decreases
the magnitude of the health shock on average log labor income by 19 percentage points. Senior
individuals with some schooling or at least a high school degree face an additional decrease in
average log labor income of 1.3 percentage points or 8.4 percentage points for each child present
when those senior individuals experience a health shock (Columns 3 and 5). It appears that children
are useful at mitigating income shocks only for senior individuals with no education.
Table 3.6 presents the results using log total income rather than log labor income as the
outcome variable. Again we find significant decreases in average log total income for senior individ-
uals with no children who experience a health shock in the previous period (Columns 1-2) and these
decreases are smaller in magnitude than the decreases found when observing log labor income. The
presence of children mitigates the magnitude of the decrease in average log total income (Column 1),
with both sons and daughters increasing average log total income. The presence of each additional
male (female) child decreases (increases) the magnitude of a health shock in the previous period for
senior individuals with some education (Column 4). Senior individuals with at least a high school
degree are not found to have significant effects on log total income regardless of the number of
children present (Columns 5-6). Again, this suggests that senior individuals with higher education
levels are able to mitigate income shocks without the use of their children.
Our results suggest that senior individuals who experience shocks to their health (and there-
fore shocks to their income) use their children as tools to help mitigate the effects of these shocks.
Female seniors and uneducated seniors are the individuals who are most likely to be affected by a
health shock and are found to use children as a consumption smoothing tool to a higher degree.
3.5 Conclusion
We find that senior individuals who experience a health shock in the previous period increase
their probability of reporting bad health in the current period. The magnitude of the increase due
to a health shock in the previous period lessens with each additional child present, where senior
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individuals with no children experience a 22 percentage point increase in the probability of reporting
bad health in the current period, senior individuals with one child experience a 20.4 percentage point
increase in the probability of reporting bad health in the current period, and senior individuals with
two children experience a 18.8 percentage point increase in the probability of reporting bad health
in the current period. Male children drive the decrease in magnitude of a health shock for senior
individuals. When the sample is divided by senior individuals’ gender, we find that senior individuals
of both genders experience smaller increases in the probability of reporting bad health in the current
period when the number of children increases and the senior individual experiences a health shock.
Children of uneducated senior individuals have the greatest impact on mitigating the probability
of their parents reporting bad health in the current period when their parents experience a health
shock in the previous period.
Reductions in average log labor income and average log total income are also mitigated when
the number of children increases and senior individuals experience a health shock in the previous
period, with each additional child increasing average log labor (total) income by 12 (15) percentage
points. These significant changes are found mainly in senior females (mothers) and uneducated
senior individuals, suggesting that children more easily replace a mother’s (labor) income when she
becomes ill. Educated senior individuals are likely to have other forms of insurance and do not
required the assistance of their children when they face a health shock as heavily as uneducated
senior individuals.
Our results suggest that children are being used as a tool to mitigate income shocks for senior
individuals who do not possess formal insurance. When a senior individual experiences a shock
to their income (represented through a health shock in this analysis), children of that individual
step in to assist their parents financially, which allows their parents to continue smoothing their
consumption. Formal insurance has been introduced in developing countries, but many individuals
choose to continue using informal methods to insure against risk. To understand individual fertility
decisions, researchers and policymakers must consider all roles a child plays within the household.
With the acceptance of more formal insurance methods, the need for larger family sizes may be
altered.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Bad health 0.757 0.429 18605
Labor income 9710.745 57054.722 18418
Total income 13696.443 58380.438 18423
Age 58.126 10.438 21107
Female 0.52 0.5 21131
Uneducated 0.537 0.499 21131
Some schooling 0.357 0.479 21131
Completed high school 0.106 0.308 21131
Rural 0.595 0.491 17705
Height (m) 1.581 0.086 13684
Weight (kg) 58.803 11.833 13725
Health shock 0.559 0.497 21132
Twins 0.021 0.143 18529
One Child Policy 3.066 0.852 20887
N. children 2.705 1.395 18578
N. sons 1.418 0.997 18578
N. daughters 1.287 1.1 18578
Avg. years schooling (children) 9.593 3.517 18446





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Summary Statistics: Children Ages 15-19
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Age 16.852 1.375 268524
Female 0.469 0.499 268514
Rural 0.625 0.484 268524
Hindu 0.816 0.387 268378
Currently Enrolled 0.432 0.495 267442
Literate 0.765 0.424 268065
No Schooling 0.245 0.430 268065
Primary Completed 0.683 0.465 268065
Secondary Completed 0.238 0.426 268065
Employed 0.312 0.463 268400
Employed (incl. Housework) 0.513 0.500 268400
Weekly Wages (2010 Rupees) 52.876 1325.740 268407
Mother’s Age 41.323 5.407 201700
Mother Completed Primary 0.302 0.459 201570
Mother’s Weekly Wages (2010 Rupees) 83.179 732.138 201615
Father’s Age 47.247 6.707 188990
Father Completed Primary 0.529 0.499 188886
Father’s Weekly Wages (2010 Rupees) 596.078 2224.923 188945
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Table A2: Summary Statistics: Adults Ages 15-34
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Age 23.266 5.524 883212
Female 0.520 0.500 883168
Rural 0.625 0.484 883212
Married 0.575 0.494 882989
Hindu 0.824 0.381 882758
Currently Enrolled 0.171 0.376 876487
Literate 0.675 0.468 882352
No Schooling 0.339 0.473 882352
Primary Completed 0.582 0.493 882352
Secondary Completed 0.254 0.435 882352
Employed 0.481 0.500 882834
Employed (incl. Housework) 0.782 0.413 882834
Weekly Wages (2010 Rupees) 148.757 1516.894 882846














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Probability of Secondary School Completion:
Triple Difference
Effect of Religion, Gender, & Rural Status
Children Ages 15-19
Hindu Female Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hindu * Reform Active 0.00850 0.0178 0.0177*
(0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0088)
Female * Reform Active 0.0146** 0.0143* 0.00186
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0107)
Rural * Reform Active 0.0429 0.0395 0.0391**
(0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0168)
Reform Active 0.105*** 0.0980*** 0.167*** 0.0960*** 0.0944*** 0.175*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.158***
(0.0130) (0.0114) (0.0092) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0118)
Age 0.556*** 0.560*** 0.506*** 0.557*** 0.563*** 0.506*** 0.557*** 0.561*** 0.506***
(0.0780) (0.0777) (0.0878) (0.0790) (0.0783) (0.0883) (0.0787) (0.0786) (0.0884)
Age Squared -0.0146*** -0.0148*** -0.0127*** -0.0146*** -0.0149*** -0.0126*** -0.0147*** -0.0148*** -0.0127***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Female -0.0395*** -0.0376*** -0.000736 -0.0308*** -0.0252*** 0.00423 -0.0384*** -0.0377*** -0.00133
(0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0058) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0058)
Hindu 0.0642*** 0.0727*** -0.0117 0.0856*** 0.0604*** 0.0882*** 0.0616***
(0.0110) (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0161) (0.0083) (0.0156) (0.0081)
Rural -0.176*** -0.0710*** -0.176*** -0.0697*** -0.263*** -0.265*** -0.114***
(0.0081) (0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0081)
Mother’s Age 0.00289*** 0.00285*** 0.00288***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Mother Completed Primary 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208***
(0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0085)
Mother’s Weekly Wages 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Father’s Age -0.000145 -0.000119 -0.000151
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Father Completed Primary 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.150***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0085)
Father’s Weekly Wages 0.000009* 0.000009* 0.000009*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Average Secondary School Completion 0.238 0.238 0.270 0.238 0.238 0.270 0.238 0.238 0.270
N 267911 267911 180760 268057 267911 180760 268057 267911 180760
R2 0.105 0.141 0.261 0.101 0.140 0.261 0.136 0.141 0.261
Notes: All columns include state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in paren-
theses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table A6: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Probability of Child Labor (Including House-
work):
Triple Difference
Effect of Religion, Gender, & Rural Status
Children Ages 10-14
Hindu Female Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Hindu * Reform Active -0.0344** -0.0376*** -0.0275**
(0.0128) (0.0124) (0.0115)
Female * Reform Active 0.00247 0.00401 0.00195
(0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0161)
Rural * Reform Active -0.0149 -0.0139 -0.0136
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0107)
Reform Active -0.0834*** -0.0830*** -0.0928*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.162***
(0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0124) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0094)
Age -0.0426*** -0.0386** -0.0412*** -0.0428*** -0.0384** -0.0413*** -0.0395** -0.0387** -0.0415***
(0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0149)
Age Squared 0.00376*** 0.00363*** 0.00366*** 0.00377*** 0.00363*** 0.00367*** 0.00367*** 0.00364*** 0.00368***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Female 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.109***
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0077) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0117)
Hindu -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.0748*** -0.0333*** -0.0144** -0.0400*** -0.0211***
(0.0144) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0059) (0.0097) (0.0051)
Rural 0.107*** 0.0641*** 0.107*** 0.0633*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.113***
(0.0113) (0.0073) (0.0116) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0074)
Mother’s Age -0.000305 -0.000312 -0.000469
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Mother Completed Primary -0.0629*** -0.0633*** -0.0637***
(0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0063)
Mother’s Weekly Wages 0.000002* 0.000002 0.000002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Father’s Age 0.000158 0.000208 0.000257
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Father Completed Primary -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.114***
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0066)
Father’s Weekly Wages -0.000001** -0.000001** -0.000001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Average Employment 0.166 0.166 0.151 0.166 0.166 0.151 0.166 0.166 0.151
N 332444 332444 277623 332561 332444 277623 332561 332444 277623
R2 0.121 0.138 0.178 0.128 0.145 0.187 0.144 0.146 0.185
Notes: All columns include state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and presented in paren-
theses. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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